The opinion of the court was delivered by: J. Phil Gilbert District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Donald Lee Weidenburner's ("Weidenburner" or "Defendant") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 592) and Memorandum (Doc. 593) in support thereof. Specifically, Weidenburner seeks to dismiss the operative indictment, alleging that prosecution thereunder violates his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Government filed a Response (Doc. 595) thereto, to which Weidenburner did not file a reply.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Weidenburner filed his supporting memorandum eight days after he filed the instant motion. Weidenburner did not seek leave to file the extremely belated memorandum, nor did he notify the Court that he would be filing such a memorandum. This course of action implicitly violates Local Rule 7.1(c), which states that "[m]otions . . . to dismiss . . . shall be supported by a brief." While the Court could very well strike Weidenburner's memorandum on grounds of untimeliness, the Court DEEMS it timely in order to give his motion a full and fair shake.*fn1
The operative indictment in this criminal proceeding is the Third Superseding Indictment (Doc. 152), which was filed on June 3, 2003.*fn2 Weidenburner was apprehended in the Western District of Kentucky in November 2010 and was arraigned on December 10, 2010 - over seven years after the operative indictment's filing. Weidenburner now moves to dismiss the indictment on grounds that it violates his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ."
U.S. Const. amend. VI. To discern whether one's constitutional speedy trial right has been violated, the Court considers the conduct of both the government and the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); United States v. Arceo, 535 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2008). More precisely, the Court weighs the following four factors, originally articulated in Barker:
1) Whether delay before trial was uncommonly long;
2) Whether the government or defendant is more to blame for such delay;
3) Whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and
4) Whether he suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (relying upon ...