The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Joan B. Gottschall
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Defendant Centrue Bank ("Centrue") moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff Donna Camp ("Camp") on her third amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
Having previously provided a lengthy description of the facts in this case, the court will only briefly summarize certain undisputed facts here. See Camp v. Centrue Fin. Corp., No. 08 C 4020, 2010 WL 1333811 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2010). At some point in 2006, Camp began working as a Mortgage Loan Originator ("MLO") for Centrue Bank at Centrue's Yorkville, Illinois branch. In that role, Camp's direct supervisor was Dan Sabol, who was himself supervised by Executive Vice President Roger Dotson. As an MLO, Camp's duties included, inter alia, obtaining business from realtors, building a customer base, and working with existing customers. MLOs do not, however, have lending authority or underwriting responsibility. Centrue employees who are permitted originate, approve, and close home equity lines of credit ("HELOCs") do so through a computerized loan scoring and lending program called Mark IV. Thus, when Camp (who previously had acted as a personal banking supervisor) became an MLO, Centrue should have eliminated Camp's access to Mark IV, but that did not happen.
However, Dotson specifically told Camp at a November 16, 2007 meeting that she was not to use Mark IV. Dotson believed that allowing MLOs to access Mark IV (which allows the same person to input, review, and close a qualified loan) created a potential security or fraud problem, and could have caused Centrue to be noncompliant with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. During that meeting, Camp argued with Dotson, but later apologized and confirmed that she would focus only on mortgages from that point forward.
Camp continued to use Mark IV unbeknownst to Dotson. During a February 20, 2008 review, he noticed that Camp's name was listed in a Mark IV access log; further investigation indicated that Camp had logged onto Mark IV at least ten times and that she had used other people's names to do so. Dotson decided to discharge Camp, and spoke with various Centrue executive board members, as well as with Heather Hammitt (the Director of Human Resources), regarding his decision. On February 25, 2008, Dotson advised Sabol, Camp's supervisor, that he planned to fire her. Sabol asked him to reconsider, but Dotson declined to do so. On February 26, 2008, Dotson drove to the Yorkville facility and terminated Camp's employment.
At some point during this process, Dotson personally learned that Camp had requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") so that she could be treated for cancer. Camp had first contacted one of Centrue's benefit specialists, Donna Mussatto, regarding FMLA leave on or about February 8, 2008. Mussatto received Camp's FMLA request via email on February 25, 2008 and confirmed Camp's FMLA eligibility that same day. Camp was notified that her FMLA request had been approved the day after her employment was terminated by Dotson.
Camp filed suit in state court. The action was removed, and this court permitted Camp to amend her complaint twice. In her second amended complaint, she alleged, inter alia, wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of the FMLA.*fn1 Centrue filed a motion for summary judgment. While the briefing on the summary judgment motion was underway, Camp sought leave to amend her complaint a third time to assert an FMLA interference claim. The court granted summary judgment on the second amended complaint, but also granted Camp leave to amend. In so doing, the court warned that "it is not obvious how Camp can prevail on the merits of her interference claim given the findings in this order." Centrue has now moved for summary judgment on the third amended complaint, which the court addresses below.
Summary judgment is warranted where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).On summary judgment, all facts and any inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. McCann v. Iroquois Mem'l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 2010). Of course, the court is not required to make every conceivable inference in the non-movant's favor; instead, only reasonable inferences must be drawn. Smith v. Hope Sch., 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). Further, the non-moving party cannot "merely allege the existence of a factual dispute to defeat summary judgment." McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 226 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2000). The non-movant must provide sufficient evidence so as to "allow a jury to render a verdict in her favor." Id. If a plaintiff fails to establish one of the elements of her case and there is no factual dispute regarding that element, then summary judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529-30 (2006); Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2005).
1. Previously Admitted Facts
As a preliminary matter, Centrue urges the court to treat as admitted all of the facts the court previously deemed admitted when it granted summary judgment on Camp's second amended complaint. Certain of those facts were (and are) admitted by Camp; others the court decided to treat as admitted due to Camp's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) and other governing principles. See Camp, 2010 WL 1333811, at *1 n.1.*fn2 Camp, in turn, argues that justice ...