The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
E-FILED Monday, 16 May, 2011 03:45:10 PM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
This cause is before the court for consideration of the Defendants motion for summary judgment [d/e 49] and the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. [d/e 52].
The pro se Plaintiff originally filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on November 28, 2008. On December 15, 2009, the court dismissed the Plaintiff's original complaint as a violation of Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See December 15, 2008 Court Order. The Plaintiff was given additional time to file an amended complaint and on July 21, 2009 the court found that the Plaintiff had stated the following claims:
a) Decatur Police Officer Chad Ramey used excessive force against the Plaintiff on January 10, 2007; and,
b) Decatur Police Officer Chad Larner failed to protect the Plaintiff from the assault by Officer Ramey. See July 20, 2009 Merit Review Order.
The Defendants have now filed a motion for summary judgment. [d/e 49]. The Plaintiff has filed a response to the dispositive motion [d/e 53], but he has also filed a "Motion for Default Judgment." [d/e 52]. The Plaintiff's motion is actually asking the court to strike the Defendants' motion for summary judgment as untimely. On January 31, 2010, the court struck the first motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendants because it was not submitted in the proper format. See January 31, 2011 Text Order. The Defendants had not provided a statement of undisputed facts, nor did they provide a memorandum citing the relevant facts and law in support of their motion. Therefore, the court struck the Defendants' motion and gave them 21 days to refile. The Defendants filed the revised motion for summary judgment on the 21st day. [d/e 49] However, the Plaintiff says he did not receive his copy until after the stated deadline. The court finds that the motion was timely filed and the Plaintiff has had ample time to file a response. The Plaintiff's motion is therefore denied. [d/e 52]
The Plaintiff was charged in Macon County with several drug offenses as the result of his arrest on January 10, 2007. (Def. Mot, Ex. 1). The incident alleged in the Plaintiff's complaint occurred during his subsequent custodial interrogation at the Decatur Police Department. The Assistant Public Defender who was appointed to represent the Plaintiff moved to suppress the Plaintiff's confession claiming that it was coerced. (Def. Mot, Ex. 2). During the hearing, the Plaintiff stated that Officer Ramey punched the Plaintiff with his fists two times at least two times. (Def. Mot., Ex. 2, p. 32). The Plaintiff's counsel specifically stated that the officer used "excessive force" during the interrogation. (Def. Mot, Ex. 2, p. 25) The Plaintiff also alleged that Officer Larner was in the room and did nothing during the assault. (Def. Mot, Ex. 2, p. 32-33) At the conclusion of the hearing, the state court denied the Plaintiff's motion to suppress his confession. (Def. Mot, Ex. 3, p. 3). The Plaintiff was later convicted of all offenses following a trial in case People v Gordon, Case No. 07 CF 74. That conviction has not been reversed, expunged or declared invalid.
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Any discrepancies in the factual record should be evaluated in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
"Summary judgment is the 'put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2000). "If a party . . . fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials ...