Name of Assigned Judge Blanche M. Manning Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
The City's motion to dismiss  is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the motion to strike the request for compensatory damages in Count II (ADA retaliation) is granted and the remainder of the motion is denied. This action will be referred to the magistrate judge for supervision of discovery, non-dispositive motions, and a settlement conference at the appropriate time. Once the parties receive the referral order, they are directed to jointly contact the magistrate judge's clerk to obtain a prompt initial status date. This case is set for status before this court on June 23, 2011, at 11:00 a.m.
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Plaintiff Laketa McCoy, a former Traffic Control Aide for the City of Chicago who has been diagnosed with sarcoidosis (an inflammatory disease), seizures, and diabetes, contends that the City discriminated against her due to her disabilities. The City's motion to dismiss portions of her complaint is before the court. For the following reasons, the motion to strike the request for compensatory damages in Count II (ADA retaliation) is granted and the remainder of the motion is denied.
In June of 2005, the City hired Ms. McCoy to work as a Traffic Control Aide. Shortly after Ms. McCoy began working, her doctor sent the City a letter stating that Ms. McCoy suffered from various illnesses and required accommodations such as sitting periodically, access to shade and water, and restroom breaks. The City responded by allowing Ms. McCoy to work four-hour shifts. In July of 2007, at the City's request, Ms. McCoy submitted an updated doctor's note reiterating that she needed to continue working four-hour shifts due to "multiple medical issues." Complaint [Dkt. 1] at ¶ 10. After receiving this note, the City stopped scheduling Ms. McCoy to work four-hour shifts. Ms. McCoy filed an unsuccessful internal appeal of this decision. Since September of 2008, the City has not scheduled Ms. McCoy to work a four-hour shift. Ms. McCoy contends that this decision effectively terminated her employment, although the City does not appear to have formally terminated her. Id. at ¶ 16.
Ms. McCoy filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which issued a right to sue letter on June 14, 2010. She then filed a timely four-count complaint against the City alleging that the City violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by discriminating against her based on her disabilities (Count I) and retaliating against her (Count II). She also contends that the second doctor's note counts as a request for intermittent leave or a reduced schedule under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), and that the City violated the FMLA by retaliating against her (Count III) and interfered with her ability to take FMLA leave (Count IV). The City moves to dismiss part of Count I as well as Counts II and IV in their entirety.
II. The City's Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint's request for relief must be "'plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint meets this standard when the alleged facts "allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "[N]aked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" are insufficient. Id. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court recently clarified that determining if a complaint states a plausible claim is "a context-specific task that requires [the court] to draw on [its] judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950.
B. ADA Discrimination ...