Name of Assigned Judge Blanche M. Manning Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
The defendants' motions for summary judgment [218--1] &[224-1] on Counts I, III, IV and V of Frederick's First Amended Complaint are granted. Because no other counts remain, the clerk is directed to enter a Rule 58 judgment and to terminate this case from the court's docket.
O [ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.
Plaintiff Calvita Frederick has sued her mortgage company, DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., the mortgage servicer, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., and Pierce & Associates, DLJ's counsel, alleging that the defendants are attempting to force her from her home on account of her race. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of the counts against them. The court entered a briefing schedule allowing Frederick time to respond to the motion and to the defendants' Rule 56.1 statements of fact, but Frederick has not done so. For the reasons that follow, the motions for summary judgment are granted.
The following facts are undisputed. Frederick, an attorney representing herself in this matter, purchased her home on Dorchester Avenue in Chicago in 1994. The mortgage originated with Home Savings of America, but is now held by defendant DLJ Mortgage. In 2003, a judgment of foreclosure was entered against Frederick regarding the Dorchester Avenue home, and a foreclosure sale was scheduled for January 5, 2005, but the sale was stopped after Frederick filed for bankruptcy the day before. According to Frederick, she then attempted to avoid foreclosure by lining up Thomasina Dixon (her mother) to buy her home. Frederick alleges that to complete the sale to Dixon, she needed payoff statements from DLJ, but DLJ refused to provide them in a timely manner and the sale to Dixon fell through.
In 2006, foreclosure proceedings began anew and a judicial sale occurred on May 10, 2007. Frederick alleges that defendant Pierce & Associates lied to her and told her that the May 10 sale had been cancelled so that another person she had lined up to buy her home, Scott Dantuma, would be prevented from participating in the auction. DLJ was the successful bidder at the judicial sale, but after discovering that the sale had occurred on May 10 after all, Frederick succeeded in having the sale vacated by the state court.
She then filed the instant lawsuit. Originally her ex-husband and daughters were also plaintiffs, but they voluntarily dismissed their claims. The claims that remain are as follows. In Count I, Frederick alleges that the defendants discriminated against her in violation of both the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, when they told her that the May 10, 2007, had been rescheduled in order to thwart her planned sale to Dantuma. In Counts III and IV, she alleges that the defendants tortiously interfered with her business relationships with Dixon (Count III) and Dantuma (Count IV). Finally, in Count V she alleges a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment on Counts I, IV and V. In addition, defendants DLJ and Select Portfolio filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment on Count III (to which they are the only defendants).
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Valenti v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Moreover, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment only when the ...