The opinion of the court was delivered by: Harold A. Baker United States District Judge
Wednesday, 23 March, 2011 01:38:56 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are the Defendants' summary judgment motion , Defendants' memorandum of law  and the Plaintiff's response . The Defendants, Larry Phillips and Eugene McAdory move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule56.
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Any discrepancies in the factual record should be evaluated in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
"Summary judgment is the 'put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2000). "If a party . . . fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A party opposing summary judgment bears the burden to respond, not simply by resting on its own pleading but by "set[ting] out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "If [the non-movant] does not [meet his burden], summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against [the non-movant]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Further, "[t]he plaintiff cannot merely allege the existence of a factual dispute to defeat summary judgment .. Instead, he must supply evidence sufficient to allow a jury to render a verdict in his favor." Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the non-moving party "must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial." Filipovic v. K&R Express Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 390 (7th Cir. 1999). Failure by the non-movant to meet all of the above requirements subjects him to summary judgment on his claims.
Affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and "set out facts that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added). Personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions drawn from those facts. Visser v. Packer Eng. Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991). "But the inferences and opinions must be grounded in observation or other first-hand personal experience. They must not be based on flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions or rumors remote from that experience." Visser, 924 F.2d at 659. It is also well settled that "conclusory allegations and self-serving affidavits, if not supported by the record, will not preclude summary judgment. Keri v. Barod of Trustees of Purdue University, 458 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir.2006)(citing Haywood v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir.1997).
The Plaintiff, Jerome Jacobs, is civilly detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services ("Department") pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 207/1 et seq. (West 2008) ("SVP Act"). He brings this civil rights action against the Defendants alleging the imposition of black box restraints violates his constitutional rights. Plaintiff further alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when his handcuffs injured his wrists on January 16, 2009. Defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds: First, the Black Box policy at the Rushville Facility is constitutional. Second, Defendants McAdory and Phillips lack the requisite personal involvement required under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for liability as to Plaintiff's claim regarding unconstitutional force due to overly tightened handcuffs. Third, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Undisputed Material Facts*fn1
1. Plaintiff, Jerome Jacobs, is a resident of the Rushville facility and is civilly detained pursuant to the SVP Act. (Doc. 1)
2. Defendant Phillips is the Director of the Rushville TDF and oversees the overall administration and operation of the Rushville Facility. (Defs.' Ex. C, Phillips Aff. ¶ 1).
3. Defendant McAdory is the Director of Security at the Rushville Facility and is responsible for the overall safety and security of the Rushville Facility. (Defs.' Ex. B, McAdory Aff. ¶ 1).
4. On January 16, 2009 the Plaintiff was required to wear a security device called the black box while traveling outside the facility. (Defs.' Ex. A, Pltff's Dep. pg 15).
5. Plaintiff states that the black box policy at the Rushville Facility violates his constitutional rights. (Defs.' Ex. A, Pltff's Dep. pg 6).
6. The black box is a handcuff cover that restricts a resident's access to handcuff keyholes. (Defs.' Ex. B, McAdory Aff ¶ 6).
7. The large majority of residents at the Rushville Facility have repeatedly engaged in acts of sexual violence. (Defs.' Ex. B, McAdory Aff ¶ 6).
8. There is an established history of residents acting in threatening and assaultive ways toward staff and other residents at the facility. ...