The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge James B. Zagel
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed her three-count complaint alleging violations of the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her and terminated her employment because of her disability. Defendants now move for summary judgment on all counts. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, a moving party must file a statement of material facts supported by the record. Each opposing party must file a response to the movant's statements. All material facts set forth in the moving party's statement of facts will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party.
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' statement of facts, however, she did file her own statement of facts. Defendants aks that I deem their facts admitted because of Plaintiff's failure to strictly comply with the Local Rules. Though I acknowledge that Plaintiff did not strictly comply with the Local Rule, her statement of facts did contain factual assertions that allegedly contradict facts set forth in Defendants' fact statement. Accordingly, for purposes of this motion, I do not deem all of Defendants' facts admitted, and will consider the facts set forth by Plaintiff.
Defendants also ask that I strike paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 11 of Plaintiff's affidavit (exhibit P), because it contains improper speculation and factual argument that cannot be considered on summary judgment. I agree with Defendants as to statements 6 and 7, and strike these statements from exhibit P.
Plaintiff, Peggie Porter ("Porter") is a former employee of New Age Services Corporation ("NASC"). NASC is a private, not-for-profit corporation that is a Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities ("CARF") Accredited Opioid Treatment and Human Services Provider. Defendant Paul Watford ("Watford") is employed as the Director of Finance and Administration at NASC. NASC is a provider under a contract with the Illinois Department of Human Services, Division of Alcohol and Substance Abuse to provide addiction services. NASC is funded in part by the State of Illinois to provide mental health services, and also offers a drug treatment program. Porter worked for NASC as a certified mental health counselor.
Following her son's death, Porter entered into a depression and was diagnosed with "Acute Stress Disorder." Accordingly, she went on approved leave from NASC with medical benefits from May 7, 2009 through September 20, 2009. On September 24, 2009, Watford sent Porter a letter indicating that NASC could not extend her medical leave beyond October 1, 2009. Porter's treating physician wrote to NASC in a letter dated September 30, 2009, and stated that Porter was unable to work and that he could not determine when she would be capable of resuming her duties. Watford sent Porter a letter dated October 5, 2009 advising her that her employment would end on October 31, 2009. Porter's employment was terminated on October 31, 2009.
Porter claims that because of the effects of the medications she was prescribed (Lexapro, Trazodone, and Clonazepam) she was unable to determine whether she had been injured by an unlawful employment practice until November 29, 2009. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to show that her medications impacted her in this way.
Porter did not file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Illinois Department of Human Rights against NASC within 300 days of being notified that her employment was being terminated.
Summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts presented are to be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2001). Once the moving party has set forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere allegations and ...