The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joe B. McDade Senior United States District Judge
Tuesday, 22 March, 2011 02:21:08 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are the defendants, Patrick Durkin, Edward Bowers, Geraldine Tyler, Craig Findley, Jesse Madison, Normal Sula and Thomas Johnson's summary judgment motion , memorandum of law  and the plaintiff's response . Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 56.
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Any discrepancies in the factual record should be evaluated in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
"Summary judgment is the 'put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2000). "If a party . . . fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A party opposing summary judgment bears the burden to respond, not simply by resting on its own pleading but by "set[ting] out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "If [the non-movant] does not [meet his burden], summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against [the non-movant]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Further, "[t]he plaintiff cannot merely allege the existence of a factual dispute to defeat summary judgment .. Instead, he must supply evidence sufficient to allow a jury to render a verdict in his favor." Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the non-moving party "must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial." Filipovic v. K&R Express Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 390 (7th Cir. 1999). Failure by the non-movant to meet all of the above requirements subjects him to summary judgment on his claims.
Affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and "set out facts that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added). Personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions drawn from those facts. Visser v. Packer Eng. Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991). "But the inferences and opinions must be grounded in observation or other first-hand personal experience. They must not be based on flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions or rumors remote from that experience." Visser, 924 F.2d at 659. It is also well settled that "conclusory allegations and self-serving affidavits, if not supported by the record, will not preclude summary judgment. Keri v. Barod of Trustees of Purdue University, 458 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir.2006)(citing Haywood v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir.1997).
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit complaining that he was held in the Illinois Department of Corrections 137 days longer than he should have been. Specifically, on August 23, 2006, Plaintiff was released to serve one year Mandatory Supervised Release. Plaintiff was then arrested on October 26, 2006 for Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault. It was not determined that Plaintiff was in violation of his MSR until Plaintiff was seen by the Prisoner Review Board on January 3, 2008. After Plaintiff was declared a violator, he was released back to Cook County Jail where charges for Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault were pending. Plaintiff believes that he is entitled to compensation for every day he spent incarcerated from August 23, 2007 (his original discharge date) to January 7, 2008 (the date he was released to Cook County Jail).
Undisputed Material Facts*fn1
1. Plaintiff is an inmate currently incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center. (Complaint .
2. On October 5, 2005, in Dupage County case number 04-CF-1372, Plaintiff was sentenced to three years incarceration for possession of a controlled substance. (Exhibit A, and Exhibit B - Plaintiff's Dep at 9).
3. Plaintiff was also required to serve one year of Mandatory Supervised Release ("MSR"). (Plaintiff's Dep at 9).
4. Based on Plaintiff's August 23, 2005 custody date, Plaintiff was scheduled to be released on MSR on August 23, 2006 (after accumulation of day for day ...