The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Joan B. Gottschall
Defendant Volvo Group North America ("Volvo") moved to strike portions of Plaintiff Dobrica Popic's ("Popic's") Complaint, for a more definite statement of Count I, and to dismiss Counts II and III. For the following reasons, the motion for a more definite statement is granted, the motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part, and the motion to dismiss is granted.
Popic seeks relief for an allegedly defective Volvo truck he purchased from Defendant Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. in March, 2007. Volvo maintains that its only obligation is to repair and replace parts.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must take "all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "[D]etailed factual allegations" are not required, but Popic must provide Volvo with notice of the grounds of his claim to relief by going beyond a mere recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Popic's claim for relief must be "plausible on its face," id., which occurs when there are enough facts that the court can "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
In addition, Rule 12(e) enables a defendant to seek "a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). A Rule 12(e) motion must identify the "defects complained of and the details desired." Id.
Lastly, under Rule 12(f), the "court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
Popic does not oppose Volvo's motion for a more definite statement of Count I, so that motion is granted. Popic did not oppose Volvo's motion to strike portions of the Complaint requesting consequential damages, lost profits, and attorney's fees either, but did object regarding incidental damages. Motions to strike, while generally disfavored because of their tendency to cause delay, sometimes can expedite cases. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging the general rule but noting that when "motions to strike remove unnecessary clutter from the case, they serve to expedite, not delay.").Since Popic acknowledges that some of the damages claims are not proper, striking them will remove "clutter" and the court therefore grants the motion to strike as to the prayers for relief for consequential damages, lost profits, and attorney's fees.
The issues remaining are the motions to strike Popic's claims for incidental damages and Volvo's motion to dismiss Popic's Counts II and III.*fn1 Regarding its motion to strike, Volvo argues that Popic has "failed to plead sufficient facts to support his conclusory allegation that the limited remedy of repair or replacement of defective parts failed of its essential purpose." In support, Volvo cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and claims that Popic has failed "to elaborate in any way on how or why" the limited remedies failed their essential purpose, leaving Volvo without notice of the basis for Popic's claim.
In his complaint, Popic complained of "severe" negative effects on the Volvo truck caused by "various defects." (Compl. ¶ 9.) He alleges that he brought the truck in for service at least 75 times as of September 2009. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Popic summarized the issues addressed by various visits to Volvo for servicing by citing to twenty-four invoices. Each invoice pointed to at least one, but usually more, problems with the truck. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Popic alleges that Volvo had ample opportunities to place the vehicle in a non-defective, merchantable condition, but did not, and that as a result of all the repairs the truck had been out of service for 250 days. (Compl.
¶¶ 14-16.) Therefore, Popic claims that "the limited remedy of repair and/or adjustment of defective parts failed of its essential purpose pursuant to Illinois Commercial Code, 810 ILCS 5/2-719(2)." (Compl. ¶ 27.)
The general idea of Volvo's warranty is that if Popic finds a defect in the truck, he can notify Volvo, and Volvo shall repair the defect or replace the affected parts (provided the warranty covers the parts in question). If a warranty of this type operates as intended, "[w]ithin a reasonable period of time and after a reasonable number of failures, the steady-state performance should be reached whereby the product performs as specified." AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 1978). If, however, the seller repeatedly attempts to place a product into warranted condition and fails to do so, "the remedy of repair or replacement may be deemed to have failed of its essential purpose and other remedies under the U.C.C. may be ...