Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge Amy J. St. Eve than Assigned Judge
The Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss  and denies Defendant's motion to stay  as moot. Defendant should answer by 2/17/11. Status hearing set for 3/1/11 is stricken and reset to 2/23/11 at 8:30 a.m.
O[ For further details see text below.] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.
Defendant, Sunstar Americas, Inc., has filed a motion to dismiss those portions of the Complaint that San Francisco Technology asserts against it. (R. 331.) Sunstar contends that the Complaint fails to meet both the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and the broader pleading standard of Rule 8(a). (R. 332 at 5-9.) Defendant also argues that Relator lacks standing. (Id. at 9-10.) As Relator has standing, and because the Complaint pleads facts that both satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) and allow the Court reasonably to draw an inference of deceptive intent, the Court denies Sunstar's motion to dismiss and denies Defendant's motion to stay as moot.
On March 5, 2010, San Francisco Technology filed a complaint against multiple defendants, including Sunstar, alleging that each defendant had falsely marked unpatented articles in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292. (R. 1.) Although San Francisco Technology refers to itself as "Plaintiff," the Court will refer to it as "Relator" given that the present suit is a qui tam action, in which the relevant plaintiff is the United States. Compare id. at 2 with United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 362 (7th Cir. 2010). Courtroom Deputy KF
Relator is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Jose, California. (R. 1 at 2.) Its Complaint alleges that "Sunstar makes and sells many kinds of products, including GUM Proxabrush." (Id. at 26.) It further alleges that Sunstar marked its Proxabrush Handle Snap-on products with U.S. Patents Nos. 5,027,467; 5,201,091; and 5,633,083. (Id.) San Francisco Technology also alleges that Sunstar marks its Proxabrush Travel-er products with U.S. Patent Nos. 4,691,404; 5,488,751; and 5,633,083. (Id.) The Complaint further asserts that the '404, '467, and '091 patents expired no later than 2/22/2005, 2/7/2010, and 7/2/2008, respectively. (Id.) According to the Complaint, Sunstar sold its "falsely marked products . . . after the expiration" of the '404, '467, and '091 patents. (Id.) Finally, San Francisco Technology alleges that Sunstar "marks its products with patents to induce the public to believe that each such product is protected by each patent listed and with knowledge that nothing is protected by an expired patent." (Id.)
Defendant maintains that the preceding allegations cannot survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). For reasons that the Court will now explain, the Complaint states a claim against Sunstar.
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, this "[r]ule reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep Relators out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests ." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Under federal notice-pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the amount of factual allegations required to state a plausible claim for relief depends on the complexity of the legal theory). "[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the court construes complaints in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor).
Beyond the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 9(b) requires that a plaintiff plead all allegations of fraud "with particularity," although "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). "The rule requires the plaintiff to state the identity of the person who made the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to ...