Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other or Magistrate Judge Amy J. St. Eve than Assigned Judge
The Court denies Defendant Dart's motion to dismiss . O[ For further details see text below.] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.
On September 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint alleging that Defendants Thomas J. Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois and Cook County, Illinois violated their constitutional rights based on Defendants' policy of shackling female pre-trial detainees at the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC") before, during, and immediately after they give birth. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs are suing Sheriff Dart in both his official and individual capacities. Before the Court is Defendant Dart's motion to dismiss the claims brought against him in his individual capacity. For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant Dart's motion.
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff "Dart has at all times been personally involved in the formulation and implementation of policies at the Cook County Jail." (R. 131, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs further allege that Sheriff Dart has permitted the continuation of the official shackling policy that requires correctional officers to shackle pregnant woman in the custody of the Sheriff of Cook County before, during, and immediately after labor and delivery. (Id. ¶ 6.) Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Dart's "shackling policy implements a barbaric practice that needlessly inflicts excruciating pain and humiliation." (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs also state that Sheriff Dart enforced the shackling policy in willful and wanton disregard of the laws of the State of Illinois, specifically, 55 ILCS 5/3-15003.6. (Id. ¶ 8.)
In addition, Plaintiffs maintain that at some time after December 1, 2007, Sheriff Dart learned that the widespread practice at the Cook County Jail was that pregnant female detainees would be: (1) shackled while being transported to a hospital for labor and delivery; (2) shackled during labor and delivery; and/or (3) shackled during recovery after labor. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs further allege that notwithstanding his actual knowledge of this unlawful and unconstitutional policy, Sheriff Dart waited more than one year to take remedial action concerning the shackling policy. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.)
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As the Seventh Circuit explains, this "[r]ule reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (courts accept factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor).
In his motion to dismiss, Sheriff Dart maintains that Plaintiffs' allegations concerning his personal involvement are conclusory and baseless, and thus the Court should dismiss this claim. To clarify, to recover damages under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the individual defendant was personally responsible for the constitutional violation. See Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2010); Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 462-63 (7th Cir. 2009). Specifically, a "plaintiff bringing a civil rights action must prove that the defendant personally participated in or caused the unconstitutional actions." Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Meanwhile, "a supervisor is not liable for the acts of her subordinates under § 1983 unless she was aware of and approved ...