The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Joan B. Gottschall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Yvonne Pytell's Amended Complaint asserts four claims against defendant police officers Jason Bradley and Craig Holstead and against their employer, the City of Glen Ellyn, Illinois (the "City"). On December 11, 2006, Pytell and her boyfriend Brian Krase became involved in a domestic dispute. Pytell called the police, and Bradley and Holstead responded to the call.*fn1
In her complaint, Pytell alleges that Bradley and Holstead falsely accused her of assaulting Krase and used excessive force in arresting her. The complaint identifies four claims. Count I alleges the use of excessive force in violation of Pytell's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Count II alleges false arrest under the same amendments. Count III alleges that Bradley and Holstead violated Pytell's right to due process by falsely accusing her of assaulting Krase. Each of these counts is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count IV seeks to assert liability against the City for the officer defendants' actions under 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9-120. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
At the summary judgment stage, the court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences in that party's favor. Cedillo v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge & Structural Iron Works, Local Union No. 1, 603 F.2d 7, 11 (7th Cir. 1979). However, the evidence presented at this stage must comport with the Federal Rules of Evidence and be admissible at trial, United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, Skokie, Ill., 607 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 2010), or it must consist of affidavits "made on personal knowledge, set[ting] out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show[ing] that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1).
In addition to complying with the Federal Rules, the parties must also adhere to the Local Rules for the Northern District of Illinois and this court's Standing Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment. Local Rule 56.1 provides that the moving party shall serve and file:
1) any affidavits and other materials referred to in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
2) a supporting memorandum of law; and
3) a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law . . . .
The statement referred to in (3) shall consist of short numbered paragraphs, including within each paragraph specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that paragraph.
L.R. 56.1(a). The party opposing summary judgment is required to respond with its own supporting evidence, memorandum of law, and "a concise response to the movant's statement . . . ." L.R. 56.1(b). "The district court has broad discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1." Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohnberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008). Where a party fails to reply to a statement of material facts, the facts contained in that statement are deemed to be undisputed. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AKB Enters., Inc., No. 09 C 6119, 2010 WL ...