The opinion of the court was delivered by: J. Phil Gilbert District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Tory Garrard's (hereinafter "Garrard") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52). Plaintiff Michael Allison (hereinafter "Allison") filed a pro se Response (Doc. 65) thereto, to which Garrard submitted a Reply (Doc. 66).
For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the instant motion.
The parties do not seriously discuss the facts of this case; thus, neither will the Court. With that said, in analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to Allison and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of him. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000).
Allison brings two claims (Counts VII and VIII) against Garrard pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count VII, Allison alleges that Garrard violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Count VIII, Allison alleges that Garrard violated the right to the quiet enjoyment of his home as protected under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
I. Summary Judgment Generally
Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396. In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26; Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996).
A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
II. "State Actor" for Purposes of 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code states, in pertinent part, as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). In other words, to prove a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that "(1) he was deprived of a federal right and (2) the deprivation was imposed upon him by one or more persons acting under color of state law." Ienco v. City of Chi., 286 F.3d ...