The opinion of the court was delivered by: Herndon, Chief Judge
Now before the Court is Defendant Illinois Association of School Boards's ("IASB") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Smith's First Amended Complaint (Doc. 38). Defendant contends Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead his claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") against IASB in Counts I and III of his complaint. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in Count III of the complaint should be stricken as the ADEA does not allow for punitive or emotional distress damages. In response, Plaintiff filed a memorandum opposing Defendant's motion, arguing he has adequately pleaded his claims under the ADEA and is entitled to punitive damages for his ADEA retaliation claim (Doc. 39). Based on the following, the Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART the motion to dismiss.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant IASB is an employment agency which was seeking applicants on behalf of Defendant Highland for the position of Superintendent. Plaintiff contacted Defendant IASB about potentially applying for that position. Larry Dirks, an employee of Defendant IASB, told Plaintiff that Highland was looking for someone younger for the Superintendent position. Plaintiff nonetheless submitted an application for the Highland position to Defendant IASB. Defendant IASB did not forward Plaintiff's name to Defendant Highland. Defendant Highland eventually hired someone younger than Plaintiff for the position.
Plaintiff expressed disapproval to a supervisor at IASB. After his complaint, Plaintiff continued applying for positions through IASB but alleges he was omitted from consideration because of his opposition to these practices.
On April 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging Defendant IASB discriminated against him because of his age. He later filed an amended Charge adding a complaint against Defendant Highland.
Plaintiff then filed suit against both IASB and Highland. The Complaint alleges that Defendants IASB and Highland discriminated against him based on his age and that Defendant IASB retaliated against him for opposing unlawful practices under the ADEA (Doc. 31).
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint satisfies the threshold pleading requirements under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8. According to Rule 8, a complaint need only contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED.R.CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that Rule 8 requires a complaint allege "enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face" to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Further, the Supreme Court explained it was "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief" by providing 'more than labels and conclusions' because a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do..." Id. at 555-56 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.265, 286 (1986). Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The Supreme Court recently made clear that the federal pleading standard under Rule 8 as discussed in Twombly applies "for all civil actions." Id. at ---, 129 S.Ct. at 1953. Iqbal identified the "two working principles" underlying the decision in Twombly: (1) "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice;" and (2) "only a complaint that states a plausible relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at ---, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-6). Thus, a court should only assume to be true a complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, and not its mere legal conclusions, when determining whether such allegations plausibly give rise to relief. Id. at ---, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
In its motion, IASB argues Plaintiff failed to adequately plead his claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under the ADEA. Regarding Count I, IASB contends Plaintiff failed to adequately plead a claim of employment discrimination by failing to plead a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA. Specifically, IASB argues Plaintiff needed to allege that he was qualified for the position and that the candidate who was ultimately offered the position was less qualified than him in order to adequately plead his claim. As to Count III, IASB contends Plaintiff failed to adequately plead a claim of retaliation by failing to plead a prima facie case. However, as Plaintiff contends, a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.
The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that a prima facie case is not a pleading requirement. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). The Supreme Court stated that because the prima facie standard varies depending on the nature of the case, it may be difficult to define the precise formula of the required prima facie case until discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence. Id. at ...