The opinion of the court was delivered by: Harold A. Baker United States District Court
Before the court are the defendants, Stewart Adkins, Angun, Attig, Dustin Bayler, Bennett, Boase, Jason Chalkey, Cromie, Benny Dallas, Kevin DeLong, Edward Gerber, Ryan Hitchens, Mediris, Larry Meredith, Shawn Rosenberger, Sippel and Vinson's Motion for Summary Judgment , Plaintiff's Response  and Defendants' Reply .
Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Any discrepancies in the factual record should be evaluated in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
"Summary judgment is the 'put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2000). A party opposing summary judgment bears the burden to respond, not simply by resting on its own pleading but by "set[ting] out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "If [the non-movant] does not [meet his burden], summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against [the non-movant]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Further, "[t]he plaintiff cannot merely allege the existence of a factual dispute to defeat summary judgment .. Instead, he must supply evidence sufficient to allow a jury to render a verdict in his favor." Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the non-moving party "must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial." Filipovic v. K&R Express Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 390 (7th Cir. 1999). Failure by the non-movant to meet all of the above requirements subjects him to summary judgment on his claims.
Affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and "set out facts that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions drawn from those facts. Visser v. Packer Eng. Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991). "But the inferences and opinions must be grounded in observation or other first-hand personal experience. They must not be based on flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions or rumors remote from that experience." Visser, 924 F.2d at 659.
Plaintiff, an inmate at Tamms Correctional Center, alleges, inter alia, that Defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was at Pontiac Correctional Center for three days for a court writ to the United States District Court for the Northern District. Specifically, he alleges that while he was held at Pontiac Correctional Center between April 22, 2007, and April 25, 2007, he was not given any food and that he was placed naked in a dirty cell without sheets or blankets, toilet paper or other hygiene items. He also alleges that he was deprived of his legal documents that he had brought with him for court, and that these actions were in retaliation for a lawsuit he had filed in the Southern District against staff at Tamms. Plaintiff claims he complained to each of the above-named Defendants, and that none of them did anything to help him.
MATERIAL FACTS CLAIMED TO BE UNDISPUTED*fn1
1. Plaintiff has been confined at Tamms since January 2003. (Defs.' Ex. A, at 93.)
2. Between April 22, 2007 through April 25, 2007, Plaintiff was housed at Pontiac Correctional Center, although his parent institution was Tamms Correctional Center. (Complaint.)
3. As part of a transfer to Chicago pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, Plaintiff was temporarily confined at the North Cell House of Pontiac during the period from April 22 to 25, 2007. (Compl. ¶¶ 69, 100.)
4. Mr. White's 2006 confinement at Pontiac was also temporary, and may have been as brief as a single night. (Defs.' Ex. A, at 93.)
5. Before Plaintiff's April 2007 confinement at Pontiac, Plaintiff was housed at Pontiac on only one other occasion since 2003 ...