The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel Der-yeghiayan, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Petitioner Damian Greenwell's (Greenwell) petition for writ of habeas corpus (Petition). For the reasons stated below, we deny the Petition.
On November 20, 2006, a jury convicted Greenwell in an Illinois state court of aggravated battery with a firearm based on an accountability theory. Greenwell was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment. On February 20, 2007, Greenwell filed motions in state court for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied Greenwell's motions. Greenwell appealed his conviction, and on September 30, 2008, the state appellate court affirmed the conviction. Greenwell petitioned the state appellate court for rehearing, and on October 27, 2008, the state appellate court denied the petition. Greenwell then filed a petition for leave to appeal (PLA) to the Illinois Supreme Court, which the Illinois Supreme Court denied on January 28, 2009. On February 1, 2010, Greenwell filed the instant Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Greenwell argues in his Petition: (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not move for severance of his trial from that of his co-defendant, and (2) that the evidence presented at trial did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Greenwell was guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm based on an accountability theory.
An individual in custody pursuant to state court judgment may seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides the following:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The decision made by a state court is deemed to be contrary to clearly established federal law "'if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). The decision by a state court is deemed to involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law "'if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.'" Emerson, 575 F.3d at 684 (quoting Bell, 535 U.S. at 694).
Respondent argues that Warden Keith Anglin (Anglin) is the appropriate respondent in this case, and that the Attorney General of Illinois should be dismissed as a party. Respondent also argues that Greenwell's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is procedurally defaulted, and that Greenwell has not asserted any claims that would warrant habeas relief.
I. Proper Respondent to the Petition
As an initial matter, we note that Greenwell is incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center in Danville, Illinois, where Anglin is the Warden. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the proper respondent to a petition is "the person who has custody over [the petitioner]." 28 U.S.C. § 2244, See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (stating that "[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained"). Thus, Anglin is substituted as the Respondent and the Attorney General of Illinois is dismissed from the instant Petition. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-36 (2004)(stating that "the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official")(citation omitted).
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Respondent argues that Greenwell's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is procedurally defaulted. A petitioner's habeas claims are procedurally defaulted unless the petitioner "first submit[s] his claims through one full round of state-court review." Johnson v. Hulett, 574 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 2009). To meet the presentment requirement, a petitioner "must have fairly presented the substance of h[is] claims to the state courts by articulating both the operative facts and applicable law that he claims entitle h[im] to relief." Id. Greenwell argues in his Petition that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for severance of Greenwell's trial from the trial of his ...