The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently pending before the Court is the Pride of San Juan ("PSJ") Plaintiffs'*fn1 second motion to clarify  the Court's February 2, 2010 order . In the motion to clarify, the PSJ Plaintiffs contend that in its February 2, 2010 order, the Court failed to award attorneys' fees to the PSJ Plaintiffs and to claimants Sato, The Garlic Company, and Royal Rose (collectively "the Sato Plaintiffs"), despite each group having timely submitted their fee requests and supporting documentation. The motion also brings to the Court's attention the fact that the February 2, 2010 order  inadvertently was inconsistent in its award of interest to the parties. The February 2, 2010 order  is clarified and amended as follows.
The PSJ Plaintiffs sought reimbursement of attorneys' fees and costs under a common fund theory . The Court denied the PSJ Plaintiffs' motion for reimbursement of costs and fees under a common fund theory in a memorandum opinion and order  issued on February 2, 2010.
In another February 2, 2010 order , this Court addressed the other PACA claimants' claims for contractual attorneys' fees, to which both the Sato Plaintiffs and Defendants had raised objections. First, the Court concluded that certain claimants' invoices created a contractual right to attorneys' fees. Second, the Court addressed the reasonableness of the claimed attorneys' fees. After considering the hourly rate and the documentation regarding the hours worked, the Court concluded that the fees requested by six claimants -- Coosemans Chicago, Inc., Jab Produce, Inc., Tuchten, Sato, The Garlic Company, and Royal Rose -- were reasonable. Therefore, as reflected in the Court's claim award chart set forth in the order , the Court awarded attorneys' fees to Coosemans, Jab, and Tuchten. However, the contract-based fees awarded to Sato, The Garlic Company, and Royal Rose inadvertently were omitted from the Court's claim award chart. The chart below remedies that error.*fn2
With respect to the PSJ Plaintiffs, in the February 2, 2010 order , the Court noted that seven of the PSJ Plaintiffs -- Classic Salads, Dayoub Marketing, Inc., Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., Natural Forest, Inc., The Kinoko Company, The Mandolini Co., Inc., and Seashore West -- would have been entitled to contract-based attorneys' fees had they submitted proper documentation demonstrating the reasonableness of the claimed the hourly rate and the number of hours worked.*fn3 However, the Court disallowed the PSJ Plaintiffs' requests for contract-based attorneys fees on the ground that they had failed to supply the required supporting documentation. In their second motion to clarify , the PSJ Plaintiffs point out that they submitted the requisite documentation in connection with their common fund motion, and request that the Court consider that documentation in connection with their request for contract-based fees.
As the Court noted in its April 14, 2010 minute order , it would be inequitable not to consider the documentation that the PSJ Plaintiffs submitted in support of its request for common fund fees as providing support for an alternative request for contract-based fees. Therefore, the Court will consider the reasonableness of the request for contract-based fees asserted by the seven PSJ Plaintiffs that are entitled to such fees. Those PSJ Plaintiffs seek $17,144.29 in attorneys' fees and costs billed by two attorneys.*fn4 [See ex. A to 201]. Defendants previously-raised a number of objections to the reasonableness of the PSJ Plaintiffs' requested fees in the context of the common fund motion. See . In particular, Defendants object to the PSJ Plaintiffs' attorneys' fee request on a number of grounds: (1) the claimed hourly rates are unreasonable; (2) the claimed hours are unreasonable, unnecessary, and did not benefit the other beneficiaries; and (3) the costs are not sufficiently-documented. The Court addresses Defendants' objections in Section II.A below.
On the basis of the circumstances as the Court understood them at the time of its February 2, 2010 order , the Court exercised its discretion to refuse to award statutory interest to Champ Produce. The Court reasoned that awarding such interest would be inequitable, given that each PACA claimant stands to recover only a pro rata share of its claims. Because Defendants objected only to Champ's claim for statutory interest, the Court erroneously believed that Champ was the only claimant seeking prejudgment interest at the Illinois statutory rate. The Court also noted that, if it were to award prejudgment interest, it would be inclined to do so at the federal statutory rate. It has since come to the Court's attention that its order was not consistent in regard to the award of interest. In particular, eight other claimants -- Natural Selection, California Specialty Produce, California Citrus, Alamax, Alpine Foragers, PSJ, Lakeside, and Seashore -- included prejudgment interest at the Illinois statutory rate in their total claims. The Court awarded that interest because no parties objected. The Court's order also awarded 17 claimants contractual interest at rates that far exceed the Illinois statutory rate of 5%. Finally, the Court did not award interest through the date of its order, as PSJ Plaintiffs argue it should have. The Court clarifies its order with respect to the award of prejudgment interest in Section II.B. below.
A. Reasonableness of Counsel for PSJ Plaintiffs' Fee Petition
"When determining the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, a 'lodestar' analysis, which multiplies the attorneys' reasonable hourly rates by the number of hours reasonably expended, is typically the starting point." A. Bauer Mechanical, Inc. v. Joint Arbitration Bd. of Plumbing Contractors' Ass'n and Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union 130, U.A., 562 F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2009). To determine an attorney's reasonable hourly rate, courts look to the "market rate" for the work performed, meaning "the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in question." Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1999). The burden of proving the market rate is on the party seeking attorneys' fees. Id. at 554. "[O]nce the attorney provides evidence establishing his market rate, the burden shifts to the [opposing party] to demonstrate why a lower rate should be awarded." Id. at 554-55. Because "[t]he best evidence of the value of the lawyer's services is what the client agreed to pay him," an attorney's actual billing rate is "presumptively appropriate" for use as the market rate. Mostly Memories, Inc. v. For Your Ease Only, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 931, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citations omitted).
The party seeking attorney's fees also bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the number of hours worked. McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501, 518 (7th Cir. 1993). "Hours spent are not reasonably expended if they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Stark v. PPM Am., Inc., 354 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court also must disallow "hours spent on tasks that would not normally be billed to a paying client, [and] those hours expended by counsel on tasks that are easily delegable to non-professional assistance."
Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553 (internal citations omitted). This Court has broad discretion in setting the amount of the award, including reducing the claimed hours, so long as it explains deviations from the petitioner's claimed hours. McNabola, 10 F.3d at 519.
2. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates
The PSJ Plaintiffs seek fees at a rate of $325 per hour for the partner on the case, Michael J. Keaton ("Keaton"), and $215 an hour for the associate on the case, Jonathan Ksiazek. In its February 2, 2010 order , this Court found hourly billing rates of $300 per hour and $350 per hour to be reasonable. For the reasons stated in that order, the Court finds that the hourly rates claimed by counsel for the PSJ Plaintiffs are reasonable.
3. Reasonableness of Number of Hours Billed
Counsel for Defendants conceded in open court that, in assessing the PSJ Plaintiff's request for contract-based fees, the Court should apply a reasonableness review, which necessarily is a much less searching review than would have been required in the context of a common fund request.*fn5 Consequently, a large portion of Defendants' objections to the PSJ Plaintiff's claimed fees and costs -- which were asserted in the context of a common fund request -- no longer are relevant. For example, Defendants object to numerous billing entries on the ground that the work did not benefit other trust creditors, which no longer is a relevant consideration.*fn6
a. Secretarial/Clerical/Non-Legal Work
Counsel for the PSJ Plaintiffs' fee petition includes hours expended by counsel on clerical and non-legal work "that [was] easily delegable to non-professional assistance." Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553. Seventh Circuit precedent requires this Court to disallow those hours. Id.
Specifically, on February 12, 2009, counsel for the PSJ Plaintiffs*fn7 billed.6 hour (at $235 per hour) preparing summonses, and Mr. Keaton spent.2 hour (at $325 per hour) revising those summonses. Because that work is clerical, those hours are disallowed. See First Colonial Trust Co. v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 1994 WL 49025, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1994) (reducing hourly rate for "the preparation of the summons" on the grounds that they "could have been prepared by a paralegal"); Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Sheahan, 556 F. Supp. 2d 861, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (disallowing time spent drafting summons as clerical).
Also on February 12, 2009, counsel for the PSJ Plaintiffs*fn8 billed 1.8 hours (at $235 per hour) for preparing documents for service and filing. Again, that is clerical work and thus the claimed hours are disallowed.
Mr. Keaton billed.4 hour (at $325 per hour) for a conference with the process server on February 19, 2009. That task was easily delegable to non-professional assistance, and therefore the time is disallowed. See Williams v. Z.D. Masonry, Corp., 2009 WL 383614, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. ...