The opinion of the court was delivered by: David R Herndon Chief Judge United States District Court
I. Introduction and Background
Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to reconsider (doc. 54) this Court's ruling denying remand. (Doc. 52). On May 14, 2010, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion to remand to California state court, finding that Plaintiff failed to adequately state a cause of action against non-diverse Defendant McKesson and that accordingly, McKesson had been fraudulently joined. (Doc. 52). Plaintiff contends that the Court's order denying remand was wrongly decided in that "manifest errors of law and fact exist, and that the factual analysis and legal authority relied upon by the Court necessarily requires consideration of newly discovered evidence." (Doc. 54 p. 1). Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b), 59(e), and/or 54(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion to reconsider.
A. Legal Standard on Motions to Reconsider
Generally, "motions for reconsideration serve a limited function; to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Caisse Nationale de Credit v. CBI Industries, 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir.1996). Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of [the motion under reconsideration]." Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir.1987) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D.Ill.1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir.1984)). Here, Plaintiff seeks relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), 60(b), and/or 54(b).
A Rule 59(e) motion serves a narrow purpose and "must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence." LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir.1995)(citing FDIC v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir.1986)). See also Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.1996). "A manifest error is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent." Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). It is at a district court's discretion as to whether reconsideration is warranted under Rule 59(e). See Id; Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 407 (7th Cir.2000). The rule does not serve as a vehicle to re-litigate old matters or to advance new legal theories. Moro, 91 F.3d at 876.
Rule 60(b) authorizes a district court to relieve a party from final judgment or order for six reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ...; (3) fraud ...; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged ...; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Rule 60(b) is a more restrictive regimen than Rule 59(e). Cash v. Illinois Div. of Mental Health, 209 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir.2000). Rule 60(b) is "an extraordinary remedy. The rule was designed to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances and not merely to erroneous applications of law." Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of General Motors Corp. 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Finally, to the extent the Court's order denying remand is not a final order, Plaintiff requests relief pursuant to Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part:
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
As is discussed more fully below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient grounds for reconsideration under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b). Further, the Court remains convinced that the jurisdictional requirements for removal are present and that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action against McKesson. Accordingly, to the extent the Court's order is not a final ...