The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel Der-yeghiayan, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Credit Bureau of North America, LLC's (CBNA) motion for judgment on the pleadings and Plaintiff Joanne Startare's (Startare) motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, we deny CBNA's motion for judgment on the pleadings and grant Startare's motion for summary judgment.
Startare alleges that CBNA is a debt collector who tried to collect a debt Startare owed to American General Financial. Startare states that after CBNA tried to collect the debt, Startare contacted the Chicago Legal Clinic's Legal Advocates for Seniors and People with Disabilities program (LASPD), seeking legal representation to address "her financial difficulties" and "CBNA's collection actions." (A Compl. Par. 7). Startare claims that on July 1, 2009, one of Startare's attorneys at LASPD sent CBNA a letter advising CBNA that Startare was represented by legal counsel and that, due to her financial circumstances, Startare refused to pay the debt (July 2009 Letter). According to Startare, the July 2009 Letter also directed CBNA to cease contacting Startare directly and to cease all further collection activities based on Startare's refusal to pay the debt. Startare claims that in spite of the letter, CBNA continued its collection activities by having a representative call LASPD on July 17, 2009, and August 25, 2009, to demand repayment of the debt.
Startare further alleges that in response to the CBNA representative's calls, one of Startare's attorneys at LASPD wrote a second letter to CBNA, which was dated August 31, 2009 (August 2009 Letter). Startare claims that the August 2009 Letter also requested that CBNA cease all collection activities based on Startare's refusal to pay the debt because of her financial circumstances. After receiving the August 2009 Letter, CBNA allegedly continued its collection activities by having the same CBNA representative call LASPD on September 22, 2009. During that call, the CBNA representative allegedly demanded that LASPD call CBNA back. Startare claims that on September 28, 2009, a paralegal from LASPD returned CBNA's call and spoke with another representative at CBNA, who again demanded that Startare pay the debt. Startare includes in her complaint a claim for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.. CBNA has moved for judgment on the pleadings and Startare has moved for summary judgment.
A party is permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Rule 12(c)) to move for judgment on the pleadings after the parties have filed the complaint and the answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). The courts apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)) motion to dismiss standard when ruling on Rule 12(c) motions. Guise v. BWM Mortgage, LLC, 377 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2004); Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc., 163 F.3d at 452. Thus, to defeat a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "[a] complaint must always . . . allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)(noting that "the old formula-that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt without merit-was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision").
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations," Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 2000), and "view the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . ." Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc., 163 F.3d at 452 (quoting GATX Leasing Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1995)). The main difference between a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and a Rule 12(c) motion is that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be filed before the answer to the complaint is filed, whereas a Rule 12(c) motion may be filed "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." Id. at 452 n. 3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment, the moving party must identify "those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by pointing out "an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations in the pleadings, but, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A "genuine issue" in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).
Startare alleges in her amended complaint and reiterates in her motion for summary judgment that CBNA violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) of the FDCPA by repeatedly contacting LASPD to demand payment of Startare's debt after receiving notification that Startare refused to pay the debt. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c), [i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except--(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being terminated; (2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or (3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.
I. CBNA's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
CBNA has moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) does not apply to communication with a consumer's attorney and that, even if 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) did apply to communication with a consumer's attorney, there was no violation of the FDCPA because the July 2009 Letter and the August 2009 Letter (collectively, ...