IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
May 11, 2010
SCOTTIE RASAVADY #R74255, PLAINTIFF,
KANE COUNTY SHERIFF, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Milton I. Shadur Senior United States District Judge
On February 10, 2010 this Court entered its memorandum order ("Order") that granted pro se plaintiff Scottie Rasavady ("Rasavady") the right to proceed without prepayment of the entire $350 filing fee, then went on to dismiss Rasavady's Complaint because of his apparent failure to have satisfied the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies precondition established by 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a).*fn1 Now, nearly three months later, Rasavady has filed a handprinted motion for reconsideration of the Order.
Because of the time gap involved here, Rasavady cannot seek relief under the nonextendable short time frame established by Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 59(e). That means he must look to one of the grounds for relief prescribed by Rule 60(b)--in this instance under either (1) claimed "excusable neglect" within the scope of Rule 60(b)(1) or (2) the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6)("any other reason that justifies relief").
What Rasavady's current submission reflects is a fleshing out of the complaints that he had made about living conditions at the Kane County Jail, once by presenting a written grievance and then by a number of follow-up conversations with corrections officers and then sergeants at that institution. But Rasavady's only "explanation" for the extended delay between the February 10 dismissal and his current filing is this (copied verbatim):
1. Plaintiff Scottie Rasavady has limited access to law library to due legal work in order to prepare motion for reconsideration.
2. Plaintiff has been on court writ in Stateville Corr Center where in a cell for 24 hr days 6 days a week and no acess to library.
That does not meet the Rule 60(b)(1) standard of "excusable neglect." All of Rasavady's current filing is devoted to a factual recital, something not at all dependent on access to a law library. Hence the nearly three-month delay cannot be viewed as "excusable." And as for the Rule 60(b)(6) alternative, it has long been established that it requires "extraordinary circumstances" and not just conduct that might have qualified under Rule 60(b)(1) but fails to meet that test (see, e.g., Arrieta v. Battaglia, 461 F.3d 861, 864-65 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Accordingly Rasavady's motions (1) to allow an extension and (2) for reconsideration of the Order are denied. This action remains dismissed.*fn2