The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
This matter is now before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [#6] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the claims asserted arise pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621.
In October 2004, Plaintiff, Tina Stamm ("Stamm"), interviewed with Defendant, Inter-Con Security Systems ("Inter-Con"), for a position at its Powerton Generating Station in Tazewell County, Illinois. She was hired subject to a physical examination and submitted letters from her physicians indicating that she was capable of performing the work. However, Stamm alleges that after learning that she had a sleep disorder, Inter-Con sent her a letter dated October 19, 2004, indicating that it could not move forward with her application for employment at that time.
On November 4, 2009, Stamm brought this action alleging that she was the victim of intentional discrimination on the basis of her disability, age, and gender. Defendants have now moved to dismiss the Complaint. Stamm has filed her response, and this Order follows.
Courts have traditionally held that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears from the pleadings that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1993). Rather, a complaint should be construed broadly and liberally in conformity with the mandate in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(f). More recently, the Supreme Court has phrased this standard as requiring a showing sufficient "to raise a right to relief beyond a speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; its well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, and all reasonably-drawn inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997); M.C.M. Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 1995); Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1992).
Defendant first argues that the Complaint was untimely, as her claims were filed more than 90 days after the EEOC issued its right to sue letter on February 9, 2009. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and the ADEA confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear cases dismissed by the EEOC. A person claiming to be aggrieved shall be notified of the EEOC's dismissal of a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The person aggrieved may then bring a civil action in the district court, and has ninety (90) days after receipt of the EEOC Notice within which to do so. Id. The 90-day limitation period begins to run on the date the EEOC notice is first received. Jones v. Madison Service Corp., 744 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1984).
Respectfully, Defendant's argument is without merit. The record reflects that the February 9, 2009, notice of right to sue was mailed to the wrong address and not received by Stamm until shortly after August 6, 2009, when the EEOC remailed it to a correct address. In its letter of transmittal, the EEOC specifically states that due to its errors, Stamm's 90-day period would not commence until she received the August 6, 2009, mailing, not ...