The opinion of the court was delivered by: George W. Lindberg Senior U.S. District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Maryanne Koll's ("Koll" or "defendant") motion to dismiss the one count information ("information"), pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rules") 7(c)(1) and 12(b)(2). For the reasons set forth more fully below, the motion to dismiss is denied.
In the information, the government charged Koll with one count of conspiring with Individual A to solicit cash bribes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). Specifically, the government alleges that Koll, as an agent of the Illinois Department of Public Health ("IDPH"), conspired to solicited cash bribes with a value in excess of $5,000 for the purpose of allowing individuals to pass Sanitation Certificate examinations and thereby causing the IDPH to issue Sanitation Manager certificates to these individuals. The information combines the value of a number of the bribes and alleges that Koll accepted a total of at least $14,000 from Individual A and approximately 96 food service applicants referred to her by Individual A.
Koll moves to dismiss the information pursuant to Rule 7(c)(1) because she claims that it fails to allege facts, even if proven, that would constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. Specifically, Koll argues that "the information is far too vague in describing the acts with which [she] was charged to pass either procedural or constitutional muster." Koll also argues that for purposes of Rule 12(b)(2), the information fails to adequately allege (1) that Koll was an agent of the State of Illinois when she allegedly solicited bribes from those seeking Sanitation Manager Certificates; (2) that the property at issue in this case had a value in excess of $5,000; and (3) that she entered into the alleged conspiracy "willfully" and "knowingly."
At this stage in the proceedings, the court takes the facts in the information as true and "view[s] all facts in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 880 (7th Cir.1999). Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(1), an information "must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."
FED.R.CRIM.P. 7(c)(1). To withstand a motion to dismiss, "an [information] must allege that the defendant performed acts which, if proven, constituted a violation of the law that he or she is charged with violating." United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir.1987). An indictment is sufficiently charged if it (1) states all the elements of the charged offense; (2) informs the defendant of the nature of the charges; and (3) allows the defendant "to plead the judgment as the bar to any later prosecution for the same offense." United States v. Serola, 767 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1985).
The elements of a conspiracy charge are (1) that the alleged conspiracy existed and (2) that the defendant knowingly and intentionally became a member of the conspiracy. United States v. Akinrinade, 61 F.3d 1279, 1288 (7th Cir. 1995). The elements of the underlying bribery charge are that (1) the defendant was an agent of the relevant state or local government or agency; (2) which received in excess of $10,000 under a federal program involving a federal grant; (3) the defendant committed the statutory proscribed acts with respect to property that was owned by, or under the care, custody or control of the state or local government or agency; and (4) the property at issue had a value in excess of $5,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 666.
First, Koll argues that the information violates the requirements of Rule 7(c)(1) because it is not plain, or definite, and does not contain the essential elements of the charged offense. The Court disagrees. The information clearly and concisely states a charge of conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). Therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied as to Koll's claim that the information does meet the requirements of Rule 7(c)(1).
Next, the Court turns to Koll's argument that she was not an agent of the IDPH or the State of Illinois for purposes of Section 666. As stated above and in this Court's ruling on a prior motion to dismiss, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court takes the facts in the information as true and construes all facts in the light most favorable to the government. The government alleges that Koll was an agent of the IDPH, which is an agency of the State of Illinois. As the case law Koll cited in her written submissions demonstrates, whether Koll was in fact an agent of the IDPH for purposes of Section 666 is a factual question that cannot be ...