The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
Now before the Court is Ronald Lee's ("Lee") Dilatory or Calendar Motion, docketed as a Motion for Extension of Time to File a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition. For the reasons set forth below, Lee's Motion [#52] is DENIED, and is instead converted into a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
On March 10, 2009, after pleading guilty to one count of Drug Trafficking Conspiracy and one count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, Lee was sentenced to 312 months on each of the two counts, to be served concurrently, and a five-year term of supervised release. Lee did not appeal his sentence. On March 3, 2010, Lee filed a motion entitled "Defendant Ronald Lee's Dilatory 'or' Calendar Motion," requesting that the applicable one-year statute of limitations for bringing § 2255 habeas petitions be extended for him by 45 days.
There are statutory time limits which govern whether a district court can entertain a collateral attack on a federal sentence. The present case is covered by 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which states in relevant part:
A 1 year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255. At the time of Lee's judgment of conviction, Rule 4(b)(1)(A) provided that a defendant's notice of appeal had to be filed in the district court within ten days after the later of the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed, or the filing of the government's notice of appeal. FED. R. APP. P. 4.*fn1 Neither the Government nor Lee filed an appeal here. As a result, Lee's judgment of conviction became final on March 20, 2009. He must file his § 2255 motion by March 20, 2010. Because Lee believes he will be unable to timely file his § 2255 motion, he has filed the instant motion seeking an additional 45 days to file.
To the extent that Lee's motion is one for an extension of time to file his § 2255 motion, the district court does not have authority to extend the deadline for doing so, except for those instances expressly authorized by Congress. United States v. Villalobos, 2008 WL 3992690, at *1 (C.D. Ill. 2008); Paschal v. United States, 2003 WL 21000361, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing cases). Therefore, Lee's motion for an extension of time to file his § 2255 motion is denied.
To the extent that he may also seek equitable tolling in the event he files an untimely § 2255 motion, he will likely be unsuccessful. Under Seventh Circuit case law, even if equitable tolling is available, it requires "extraordinary circumstances far beyond the litigant's control . . . ." United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000); Nolan v. United States, 358 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2004). "Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Here, Lee claims that even after due diligence, he has been unable to timely obtain the necessary information from both his prior defense counsel and the court probation office. He further explains that he is being held in the Special Housing Unit of the prison, has very limited access to legal materials and the law libraries, has been moved between facilities, and has otherwise been unable to meet with his case manager or counselor to review the necessary materials. Such circumstances do not rise to the level necessary to warrant ...