The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kathleen Paine ("Paine"), as Guardian of the Estate of Christina Rose Eilman ("Eilman"), filed this suit against the City of Chicago and various members of the Chicago Police Department (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging violations of Eilman's constitutional rights and violations of federal and Illinois law. As more fully set forth in this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated February 22, 2010, Paine brings this suit on behalf of Eilman, her daughter, for injuries that Eilman incurred after the Chicago Police Department released her from custody. Paine has now moved to exclude all or parts of the proposed testimony of eight expert witnesses. Defendants have moved to exclude all or parts of the proposed testimony of seven expert witnesses.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Omnibus Motion to Exclude Certain Expert Testimony is denied in its entirety as to the testimony of Dr. Joseph Capell.
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702") and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny. See Ervin v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 492 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2007). Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The Seventh Circuit has developed a three-step admissibility analysis for expert testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert. See Ervin, 492 F.3d at 904. First, "the witness must be qualified 'as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.'" Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702). Second, "the expert's reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony must be scientifically reliable." Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). Courts are, however, granted "broad latitude when [they] decide how to determine reliability." Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S 137, 142 (1999). Finally, the expert's testimony must be relevant, or "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Ervin, 492 F.3d at 904.
I. Defendants' Motion to Bar the Expert Testimony of Dr. Joseph Capell
Dr. Joseph Capell is a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation. After reviewing Eilman's medical records and evaluating her in person on March 30, 2009, he offers the opinions that Eilman will require extensive medical care and medical interventions as a result of her traumatic brain injury, that she has "suffered a severe impairment of her vocational potential," that the traumatic brain injury has exacerbated her bipolar disorder because it prevents her from taking "necessary and appropriate steps" to control her disease, and that Eilman's brain injury and medical problems "have not impaired her life expectancy to any appreciable degree." (R. 566, Ex. A, Expert Report of Dr. Joseph Capell, at 11-12.) (hereinafter "Capell Rep.") At his deposition, he offered further specifics about the nature of the future medical treatments that he believes Eilman will require, including additional orthopedic surgeries and additional gynecologic care in the event of a pregnancy. Defendants challenge certain of his opinions on the grounds that he lacks expertise in the relevant subject area and that his opinions are not based on reliable facts or reached through a reliable methodology.
Defendants do not contest Capell's qualifications to testify as an expert in the fields of physical medicine and rehabilitation. His Curriculum Vitae reveals that he has had an active career in rehabilitation medicine for more than thirty years. (See R. 566, Ex. B, Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Joseph Capell.)The Court accordingly finds him qualified to testify as an expert in rehabilitation medicine. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc., 846 F.2d 416, 421 (7th Cir. 1988) (reviewing experts' curricula vitae in order to support an unchallenged finding that the experts were qualified in their fields).
Defendants challenge four of Capell's opinions on the grounds that he is not qualified to testify as a psychiatric or psychological expert: 1) that Eilman was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2005 and that her "psychological condition decompensated" while she was in Chicago (Capell Rep. at 2); 2) that her traumatic brain injury has worsened her ability to monitor and control her bipolar disorder (see Capell Rep. at 11-12); 3) that she had emotional difficulties as a child and was "initially, and probably erroneously" diagnosed as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder ("OCD") (see Capell Rep. at 2); and 4) that Eilman did well in an outpatient psychiatric program after her February 2005 hospitalization (see Capell Rep. at 2). Paine has withdrawn the fourth opinion regarding the outpatient psychiatric program. Paine has also conceded that Capell will not be called on at trial to provide diagnoses of ADHD or OCD, and thus the question of whether he is qualified to opine as to the diagnoses for these conditions is moot.
As to the first challenged opinion, that Eilman's diagnosed bipolar condition "decompensated" while she was in Chicago, Capell clearly stated during his deposition that he was not "making any diagnosis of a psychological decompensation" and that he was "speaking . . . as a non-expert in the area of psychological issues." (R. 601, Ex. A, Deposition Testimony of Dr. Joseph Capell, at 129.) (hereinafter "Capell Dep.") Rather than offering this statement as an expert psychological opinion, Capell stated that his comment about Eilman's decompensation was intended "only as a transition from one part of the report to another." (Capell Dep. at 133.) He further clarified at the hearing on this Motion that he has no independent basis for the conclusion that Eilman decompensated while in Chicago and does not intend to offer it as his own expert conclusion. (See Mot. Hr'g Trans., Joseph Capell, at 66.) (hereinafter "Hr'g Trans.") Because it is clear that this is not offered as an expert opinion as to Eilman's psychological condition, but only as a passing comment in Capell's report, the Court need not decide whether he is qualified to offer it as an expert opinion.
With respect to Capell's conclusion that Eilman's traumatic brain injury has worsened her bipolar disorder by preventing her from adequately monitoring and controlling the course of her disease, however, this is offered as an expert opinion on the basis of Capell's background, experience and training in rehabilitation medicine. Defendants argue that the admissibility of this opinion depends on whether Capell is qualified to testify about Eilman's bipolar disorder as a psychological matter. Capell testified, however, that he has extensive experience with patients suffering from traumatic brain injuries who had pre-existing psychiatric disorders, and that his conclusion, held to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, is that Eilman's cognitive impairments have lessened her ability to recognize and manage her bipolar disorder. (See Hr'g Trans. at 53.) He further stated that the methodology that he employed to reach this conclusion was based in his own clinical experience and training, and not in any areas of psychological or psychiatric expertise. (See Hr'g Trans. at 54-55.) Therefore, Capell need not be qualified as a psychiatric expert in order to provide this expert opinion.
During his deposition, Capell elaborated upon his conclusion about Eilman's future medical needs in two areas that Defendants now challenge. First, he stated that on the basis of his review of Eilman's medical records, there were a number of orthopedic surgeries that "could be done in the future." (Capell Dep. at 90-91.) Defendants challenge this opinion on the grounds that Capell is not an expert in the field of orthopedic medicine. However, at hearing Capell testified that he has sufficient expertise to offer opinions as to the future orthopedic needs of a patient and that he frequently prepares life-care plans and offers expert testimony regarding orthopedic ...