The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel Der-yeghiayan, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Dahveed Dean's (Dean), Defendant Albert Jones' (Jones), and Defendant Terrance Daniels' (Daniels) pretrial motions. For the reasons stated below, we deny the motions.
I. Motion for Jencks Act Materials
Defendants have moved for an order requiring the Government to disclose Jencks Act materials 90 days in advance of trial. The Jencks Act provides that "[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). As the Government correctly points out, disclosure of material under the Jencks Act is not required until "said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case." Id. Therefore, we deny Defendants' request for the production of Jencks Act materials.
II. Motion for Santiago Proffer
Dean, Jones and Daniels have also moved for an order requiring disclosure 90 days in advance of trial co-conspirator statements the Government intends to move to admit at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)) and United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978). In another portion of his motion, Daniels has moved for disclosure of Santiago proffers four weeks in advance of trial. (DE 40, Par. 9). The Government has already agreed to provide Santiago proffers two weeks in advance of trial. Two weeks notice relating to Santiago proffers is sufficient in this case. Therefore, we deny Defendants' motions.
Daniels has also requested a hearing be held "pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)" to determine the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. (DE 40, Par. 9). It is premature to have such a hearing at this juncture and the request is therefore denied.
III. Motion for 404(b) Disclosures
Dean and Daniels request that the court order the Government to provide at least 90 days prior to trial all materials it intends to use at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) (Rule 404(b)) relating to "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" of Defendants. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). In addition, Dean has asked the court to order the Government to provide specific details as to any 404(b) evidence the Government intends to use. The Government contends that it will provide Defendants two weeks in advance of trial such material, and that such notice will comply with Rule 404(b)'s requirement that defendants be provided with "reasonable notice in advance of trial. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We agree. The Defendants' motions are therefore denied.
The Government also objects to Dean's request for specific evidentiary detail related to the Government's 404(b) evidence. Rule 404(b) merely requires the Government to provide "the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Thus, Dean is not entitled to the details he seeks in his motion.
Daniels has also objected to the Government's use of 404(b) evidence at trial. Daniels' objection to the use of any 404(b) evidence at trial is too vague and is premature. Therefore, the above referenced Defendants' requests are denied.
IV. Motion for Brady and Giglio Materials
Dean and Daniels request that the court order the Government to disclose all favorable, exculpatory, and impeaching evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and related precedent. The Government indicates that it has fully complied with Brady and Giglio and will continue to do so. Dean and Daniels have not shown that ...