The opinion of the court was delivered by: Herndon, Chief Judge
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. 15), by United States Magistrate Judge Proud, issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), recommending that the § 2254 Habeas Petition (Doc. 1) filed by petitioner Michael Williams be denied. The R&R was sent to the Parties, with a notice informing them of their right to appeal by way of filing "objections" within ten days of service of the R&R. In accordance with the notice, Petitioner has filed timely objections to the R&R (Doc. 16). Because timely objections have been filed, this Court must undertake de novo review of the objected-to portions of the R&R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS LOCAL RULE 73.1(b); Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). The Court may "accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision." Willis v. Caterpillar Inc., 199 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court must look at all the evidence contained in the record and give fresh consideration to those issues for which specific objection has been made. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review of the findings of the R&R for which no objections have been made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court adopts the findings of the R&R with the exception of one factual misstatement, which it vacates.
Petitioner Michael Williams is currently an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") and currently housed at Tamms Correctional Center. From the record, it appears that between March 1994 and May 2000, Petitioner had over 17 years of his good conduct credits*fn2 revoked for a variety of disciplinary infractions. Believing that during this time he only earned, at most, six years and two months of good conduct credits, Petitioner argues that the revocation of his good conduct credits not yet earned was in violation of his due process rights.
Petitioner first filed a pro se mandamus action with the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois in 2001, alleging as much and seeking that the Prisoner Review Board ("PRB") review the revocations in a manner that complied with the due process requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The circuit court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, which was later affirmed by the Fourth District Appellate Court on appeal in a Rule 23 Order (Doc. 11, Ex. L). The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Petitioner next filed a complaint with the Circuit Court of Alexander County, Illinois in 2004, seeking mandamus relief, a declaratory judgment, a writ of certiorari, and injunctive relief against the defendants, asserting that they had improperly revoked more than 17 years' worth of his good conduct credits before he had the opportunity to properly accrue it. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his second suit to the Fifth District Appellate Court. In its Rule 23 Order, the Fifth District affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that Petitioner's Alexander County suit was barred by res judicata in that his first suit, filed in Sangamon County, was predicated on the same set of operative facts, was pursued against essentially the same people and entities, and resulted in an outcome that was adverse to Petitioner (Doc. 1, Ex. A). Again, Petitioner filed for leave to appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court; leave was denied (Doc. 11, Ex. N).
Thereafter, Petitioner filed for habeas relief with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner asserts two grounds for habeas relief. First, Petitioner argues that because the defendants (now represented by Respondent herein) failed to raise the affirmative defense of res judicata during state circuit court proceedings, the Fifth District Appellate Court's decision affirming the dismissal based on res judicata grounds is contrary to federal law, United States Supreme Court precedent and Illinois Supreme Court precedent. Secondly, Petitioner argues that the revocation of over 17 years of his good conduct credits before he had received them violates his due process, asserting that Illinois law only allows for the revocation of credits already accumulated (see Doc. 15, p. 3). Because the R&R recommended denying habeas relief, Petitioner has objected to the recommended ruling.
The Court's review of Petitioner's § 2254 Habeas Petition (Doc. 1) is governed by the standards established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. AEDPA permits a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus if the state court reached a decision on the merits of a claim, and that decision was either (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."Martin v. Grosshans, 424 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The clauses "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" stated within § 2254 have independent meaning. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000)); see also Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2000) (also citing Williams). However, a federal court is not allowed to grant habeas relief to a state prisoner when a violation of state law is at issue. Bloyer v. Peters, 5 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993) (a federal court cannot re-examine state court determinations on state law questions in order to grant habeas relief) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-8 (1991); Reed v. Clark, 984 F.2d 209, 210 (7th Cir. 1993)).
For a state court's decision to be " 'contrary to . . . clearly established federal law as established by the United States Supreme Court,' " it must be " 'substantially different from relevant [Supreme Court] precedent.' " Washington, 219 F.3d at 628 (citation omitted). Typically, this would involve the state court "appl[ying] a rule different from the governing law set forth in [cases of the United States Supreme Court], or if it decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-5). In order for a state court's decision to result in a decision that "involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," the decision must be "objectively unreasonable." Id. It is important to note that "an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one" -- meaning that a district court is not allowed to merely substitute its own judgment as to what it believes is the correct outcome, absent a finding that the state court's decision was unreasonable. Id.; see also Washington, 219 F.3d at 628.
First, Petitioner objects to the factual finding in the R&R in which it states that he was convicted of murder. Petitioner asserts that he has never been charged with nor convicted of murder (Doc. 16, p. 1). Therefore, he asks the Court to correct this inaccurate statement. Looking at the record and also at the IDOC website listing Petitioner's inmate information, it appears Petitioner is correct in that he has no murder conviction in Illinois. Therefore, the Court sustains ...