The opinion of the court was delivered by: James B. Zagel United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After the filing of a complaint by a civilian arrestee, Plaintiff police officer became the subject of a search. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested for obstructing the investigation. After being acquitted, he was terminated. Plaintiff alleges the following counts Defendant officers and the City of Chicago: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) malicious prosecution; and (3) false imprisonment. Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing (1) probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff; (2) Defendants are qualifiedly immune; and (3) there is insufficient evidence to support Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants move to strike Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement of additional facts as well as certain of Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of undisputed facts. First, Defendants complain that Plaintiff's statement and response are untimely and incomplete. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff often times take logically inconsistent positions, and disputes facts that he collaterally estopped from disputing. Plaintiff did eventually provide supporting exhibits, thereby completing the filing. Although untimely, this delay in no way prejudiced Defendants. It is true that in his response, Plaintiff does often take certain logically inconsistent positions, and where they are material, I will address these inconsistencies. As addressed infra, Defendants collateral estoppel argument fails, and therefore it cannot be a ground for striking Plaintiff's statement or the corresponding responses.
I do, however, agree with Defendants that Plaintiff's statements of fact 5 and 6 are irrelevant and I deem them stricken. In so far as they are argumentative, statements of fact 11, 12, 20, and 21 are also stricken. Plaintiff's statement of fact 9 is stricken, as it reflects an expert opinion which had not been disclosed to Defendants. I deny Defendants' motion to strike statement 18, 19, and 39 as irrelevant. As the following discussion makes clear, what Plaintiff was told he could and could not do is integral to the question of whether probable cause existed. Statements 18 and 19 are relevant to the issue, and statement 39 helps to corroborate Plaintiff's position.
On June 7th, 2004, Plaintiff John Krupa, III ("Krupa"), a Chicago police officer, was on duty with his partner Vincent Calvino ("Calvino").*fn1 During their shift, Victor Perez ("Perez") was stopped for traffic violations and was subsequently arrested by Officers Rounds and Rivera for possession of cocaine. Defendants maintain that Krupa and Calvino assisted the two arresting officers. Plaintiff disputes this. He contends that while in their squad car, he and his partner merely pulled up to the arresting officers to inquire as to their safety, and that at the time he and his partner arrived, the arrest had already taken place.
On June 15, 2004, Perez filed a complaint alleging that a police officer had planted the cocaine in his vehicle. As a result, the Internal Affairs Division of the Chicago Police Department ("IAD") initiated an investigation. During the investigation, Perez identified Calvino as the officer who planted the drugs. Perez also described a second police officer fitting Krupa's description as Calvino's partner. On September 17, Defendants Sgt. Terrance Cochran ("Cochran"), Lt. David Naleway ("Naleway"), and Assistant Deputy Superintendent ("ADA") Debra Kirby ("Kirby"), all members of IAD, authorized a search of Plaintiff's property.
On September 30, 2004, Plaintiff was working the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. shift with his partner, Michael Parages ("Parages"). The two were ordered to drive their vehicle to the vicinity of Ogden Avenue and Christiana. They arrived at the intersection at 6:30 p.m., when members from IAD and the 10th District were waiting for them including Lt. Naleway, Sgt. Cochran, Police Agent McLaughlin, a Sgt. Winters, and K-9 Unit Officer Michael Kunis with his narcotics dog. Sgt. Cochran informed Krupa and Parages that Kunis and the narcotics dog were going to search the car and its contents. During the search, the dog indicated positive for an odor of narcotics on the back seat of the squad car as well as on two bags, one smaller green bag, and one larger black duffle.*fn2 Krupa identified the bags as his personal property, along with two other bags in the vehicle. Plaintiff was told to place all four bags in the trunk of Sgt. Winters' squad car. He then rode with Winters to the 10th District station so that Lt. Naleway could complete the search in better lighting and out of public view. Officer Parages followed in the squad car.
Once at the station, Krupa removed all four bags from the trunk and carried them to the second floor administrative office of the police station.*fn3 He entered the office through a set of double doors, each with a window. Once inside, Krupa placed his bags on sheets of newspaper on the floor. At that point, Krupa admits that he knew that his bags were the subject of an administrative search.
In his deposition testimony, Defendant Cochran testified that he ordered Krupa not to touch his bags or leave the room. Agent McLauhglin also testified that she relayed the same order. The two maintain that Krupa repeatedly asked to retrieve from his bags items such as his cell phone and keys. Sgt. Cochran testified that he told Officer Krupa that he could use the office phone if he needed to and that he could not go anywhere. Agent McLaughlin testified that she "believed" that she and others all informed Officer Krupa "not to leave the room, not to touch his property."*fn4 In his statement to IAD, Krupa denies that he was given such orders. Parages, who upon arrival sat in the foyer of the office also maintains that he never witnessed Cochran, Naleway or Kirby order Krupa not to touch or remove his belongings. The orders do not appear in the police report.
Eventually Krupa was allowed to use an office phone to call Fraternal Order of Police representative Frank Di Maria ("Di Maria"). At 8:00 p.m., Sgt. Cochran read Krupa his Miranda warning and requested he sign a consent-to-search form. At 8:09 p.m., after realizing that the consent forms contained a typographical error, Sgt. Cochran once again read Krupa his Miranda warning and presented him with a new consent form. Krupa refused to sign the forms. Di Maria subsequently arrived at the police station and was allowed to speak to Krupa alone in the administrative office. It was only after he arrived at the station that he learned of the consent forms for the first time. In his IAD statement, Officer Rivera, who was detailed to ...