The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ronald A. Guzman United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff has sued Wild Aseptics, LLC ("Wild") for breach of contract and warranty arising from its allegedly faulty production of plaintiff's Aqua Thick beverage product. Wild has filed a third-party complaint against Charles E. Sizer and Charles E. Sizer Consulting, LLC, claiming that their negligence was the cause of any problems with the Aqua Thick beverage product Wild produced. The case is before the Court on defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion.
Defendant Charles E. Sizer Consulting LLC is an Illinois limited liability company. (Third-Party Compl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Charles E. Sizer is an Illinois resident who "at all times" acted on the corporate defendant's behalf. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.)
In May 2008, Wild hired defendants, who claimed to have specialized knowledge about blending, packaging and quality assurance of hot-fill and aseptic packaged beverage products, to act as Wild's "Process Authority" for its production of plaintiff's Aqua Thick product. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 14-15, 29.) In that capacity, defendants, who had previously worked with Wild and were familiar with its facility and operations, "supervise[d] and assist[ed]" Wild in blending and packaging the product at Wild's Beloit, Wisconsin facility. (Id. ¶¶ 8-14.) Wild contends that, as a result of defendants' negligence, negligent misrepresentations and breach of fiduciary duties, the Aqua Thick it produced under defendants' supervision was contaminated. (Id. ¶¶ 16-20.) Wild seeks to recover from defendants any damages it must pay plaintiff, the unpaid portion of its contract with plaintiff and the costs and fees it incurs in defense of this suit. (Id.)
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations," but plaintiff must make sufficient "[f]actual allegations . . . to raise [her] right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (quotation omitted).
Defendants contend that Wild cannot sue Charles Sizer, individually, for the acts of the corporate defendant. Sizer's capacity to be sued is determined "by the law of [his] domicile," see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), which is Illinois. (Third-Party Compl. ¶ 2.) The Illinois Limited Liability Act states that: the debts, obligations, and liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract [or] tort . . . are solely the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the company.
A member or manager is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager. 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/10-10(a). Notwithstanding that language, Wild contends that Sizer, as the managing member of the corporate defendant, "is liable to the same extent as an officer or director of a corporation who participated in the tortious act." (Opp'n Third-Party Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 6.)
That was true under the original version of Illinois Limited Liability Act, which made a managing member personally liable for the company's acts "'to the extent that a director of an Illinois business corporation is liable in analogous circumstances under Illinois law.'" See Puleo v. Topel, 856 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (quoting 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/10-10 (West 1996)). However, in 1998, the Legislature amended the Act to its current form, which explicitly states that members and managers are not liable for corporate torts unless "a provision to that effect is contained in the articles of organization" and "a member so liable has consented in writing to the adoption of the provision or to be bound by the provision." 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/10-10(a)-(d). In the Puleo court's view, that amendment: clearly removed the provision that allowed a member or manager of an LLC to be held personally liable in the same manner as provided in section 3.20 of the Business Corporation Act. Thus, the Act does not provide for a member or manager's personal liability to a third party for an LLC's debts and liabilities, and no rule of construction authorizes this court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.
Id. at 1158 (citations omitted).
The state supreme court has yet to weigh in on the proper interpretation of this section of the statute. But, given the statute's plain language and history, that court is likely to adopt the interpretation set forth in Puleo, and this Court does as well. Unless the articles of organization state otherwise, and Wild has not alleged that they do, Sizer cannot be sued individually for the corporate defendant's torts. Thus, the Court dismisses without prejudice the claims Wild asserts against him.
The corporate defendant argues that Wild's claims against it must be dismissed as well because they are barred by Wisconsin's economic loss doctrine.*fn1 That doctrine bars a buyer of commercial goods from suing the seller in tort to recover for loss caused by the product's "inferior . . . quality" or failure to "work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold." Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Wis. 2004) (quotations omitted). But it "does not apply to contracts ...