The opinion of the court was delivered by: J. Phil Gilbert U. S. District Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Lockridge's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 89). Plaintiff Jimmie Gholson has responded to the motion by filing a declaration (Doc. 100) and a motion to dismiss the motion (Doc. 101), which the Court construes collectively as a response to the motion for summary judgment. Lockridge replied to Gholson's response (Doc. 106).
Gholson, an inmate currently housed at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, alleges in this Bivens action that Lockridge, a lieutenant at USP-Marion, was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he did not perform an injury assessment required by Bureau of Prison's policy after Gholson was involved in an altercation with other inmates on January 5, 2004.
According to Gholson's deposition testimony, on January 5, 2004, he had an altercation with other inmates and was injured. Lockridge, the "operational lieutenant," responded, handcuffed Gholson, asked everyone involved if they were okay, to which there was a collective response indicating that everyone was okay. Lockridge then took Gholson to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). According to Gholson, when they arrived at the new unit, Lockridge observed that Gholson had an injury, photographed the injury, laughed and commented that Gholson had a "big egg that's sitting inside [his] forehead," placed Gholson in the cell and walked away. Gholson states that at that time he asked Lockridge for medical help but received none. Plaintiff also testified that Lockridge said plaintiff would get to see a physician's assistant ("PA") later, but a PA never examined Gholson. Gholson believes Lockridge failed to get him medical attention when he could see that Gholson was injured and when Gholson had asked for care. Gholson also asserts that, as operational lieutenant, it was Lockridge's responsibility to ensure Gholson received an injury assessment.
Gholson clearly states that Lockridge asked him if he was okay, and Gholson told him, "Yeah, I'm okay." According to Gholson's testimony, a PA was on the scene of the altercation. The PA asked if everyone was okay and everyone responded that they were okay and they appeared okay, so the PA left. Gholson now describes his injuries as a swollen head, two black eyes, being unable to see out of his eyes, and a fractured nose. Gholson states that he was not bleeding initially but was when he arrived at the SHU. Gholson described the bump on his forehead as being "bigger than his whole forehead," not the 4 cm x 4 cm mentioned in the PA's medical report.
Lockridge's affidavit does not contradict Gholson's basic version of events, except that Lockridge makes no mention of Gholson's asking for medical care or Lockridge's observation of any injury. Rather, Lockridge, who is not medically licensed and is not responsible for inmate medical care, notes that Gholson was immediately assessed by medical personnel.
The inmate injury assessment form dated January 5, 2004, purportedly filled out five minutes after the altercation by a PA and later approved by a physician, indicate that Gholson reported, "I'm ok nothing wrong with me," and that a 4 cm x 4 cm area of edema, mid forehead was observed, but Gholson denied loss of consciousness. The injury was deemed a "superficial contusion," and Gholson was told to apply ice as needed for a 24-hour period.
According to medical records, the first medical assessment of Gholson's nose and sinus issues was December 6, 2004, during a routine medical exam. However, a letter from Gholson dated December 8, 2004, states that plaintiff had been asking for medical care since January 5, 2004, to no avail and that plaintiff had requested an x-ray and care for his nose. A review of Gholson's medical records (submitted in support of other defendants' motion for summary judgment) reveals that Gholson received quite a lot of medical attention between the January incident and December 2004 when nose issues are noted in the medical records.
In response, Gholson focuses on his visible "serious" head injury -- the "egg" on his forehead -- which Lockridge allegedly commented about at the time of the incident and for which Lockridge did not seek additional care. Gholson also cites a prison policy that every injury receive immediate attention.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosed materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396. Where the moving party fails to meet its strict burden of proof, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion. Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992).
In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26; Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). Rather, a genuine issue ...