The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jeanne E. Scott, U.S. District Judge
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Memorial Medical Center's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts V and VII of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (d/e 43) (Motion for Summary Judgment). For the reasons stated below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is allowed.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment must be granted "'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Herman v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984). Once the moving party has produced evidence showing that it is entitled to summary judgment, the non-moving party must present evidence to show that issues of fact remain. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). "Summary judgment is appropriately entered 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" McKenzie v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must do more than raise a "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. Instead, she must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Id. Finally, "[a]lthough [the court] must, for purposes of summary judgment review, draw any inferences from the record in favor of the plaintiff, [it is] not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record. [It] need draw only reasonable ones." See Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458, 467 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts below are taken from the parties' summary judgment briefing and supporting evidence.
This case involves an employee's claims that her employer failed to accommodate a disability as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff Tonicia Boston is a registered nurse (RN) who worked for Defendant Memorial Medical Center (MMC) from March 1999 through June 2005. On September 14, 2004, Boston injured her back on the job and submitted a Report of Injury to MMC's Employee Health Department. At the direction of MMC's Worker's Compensation Coordinator, Linda Eilering, Boston then reported to the Midwest Occupational Health Associates office for an examination by Dr. Jeffrey Brower. Dr. Brower diagnosed a strain in Boston's lumbar area and directed her not to lift more than 20 pounds and not to engage in repetitive waist bending. An MRI scan eventually revealed that Boston had a small left paracentral disc herniation, over which her spinal cord was slightly draped kyphotic. The MRI also showed a mild diffuse disc bulge in another spot.
Boston found that her back pain made personal care and household chores difficult. Occasionally she needed assistance to bathe, and her mother often had to prepare her meals for her and wash her dishes. Boston also could shop for groceries only rarely.
Because of her condition, MMC required Boston to undergo an examination at its Industrial Rehab Department to determine whether she was fit to continue her work as an RN. At this examination, Boston complained that she experienced lower back pain when she lifted weighted objects from the floor to her waist, when she carried a milkcart containing various weights, when she bent over, and when she moved a patient from a wheelchair to a chair. On December 6, 2004, the physical therapist who conducted Boston's examination reported that Boston was not physically able to complete the demands of her position. Specifically, he reported that Boston could not complete patient transfers. Were she to continue in her present position, he found, she would present a safety risk to patients and to herself.
After the physical therapist issued his report, Boston applied for an internal MMC transfer. She asked to switch from work as a staff nurse to a position as a clinical case manager. To help with insurance administration, a clinical case manager assesses patients to determine their likely length of stay, their discharge date, and their diagnosis. Clinical case managers also take calls from other hospitals or units within MMC to place patients in appropriate units and beds.
MMC approved Boston's request for a transfer, and on January 31, 2005, Boston started work as a clinical case manager. Boston informed her supervisor, Julie Meyer, that sitting for long hours aggravated her back condition. She eventually provided MMC physician notes, dated April 17, 2005, and April 29, 2005, stating that she should avoid prolonged sitting and should walk or move for five minutes every hour or two. Boston gave the first of these notes to Meyer and the second to Jodi Sanchez, who worked with MMC's worker's compensation unit. On both notes, Sanchez wrote "ok." Motion for Summary Judgment, Proposed Undisputed Fact Nos. 22 & 23; Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 46) (Response), at 2 (failing to dispute the statement in Proposed Fact No. 22 and 23 that Sanchez wrote on each note).
When Boston received her orientation for this position, she had to follow a co-worker, which involved a lot of sitting. While working, however, Boston "gave a good effort" at following her doctor's orders to move or walk every hour or two.*fn1 Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, Boston Deposition, at 48. Every four hours she took a smoking break, and the MMC smoking area was a five- to seven-minute walk and an elevator ride from her work station. Boston also took a 30-minute meal break each day, and the MMC cafeteria also was a five- to seven-minute walk and an elevator ride from her work station. Additionally, three or four times a day Boston would move about her office to operate a fax machine, and she also attended a daily bed placement meeting on another floor. MMC never disciplined Boston for abiding by her doctor's orders to stand and move about every hour or two.
Boston also took time off work while she was a clinical case manager. On Friday March 25, 2005, she emailed Meyer to request four hours off the next day and proposed making up that work on the following Monday. About an hour later, Meyer informed Boston that she would have to use her ...