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Google, Inc. v. Central Mfg. Inc.

August 17, 2009


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Virginia M. Kendall


Plaintiff Google Inc. ("Google") has filed this civil RICO action against Defendants Central Mfg. Inc. ("Central") a/k/a Central Mfg. Co. a/k/a Central Mfg. Co.(Inc.) a/k/a Central Manufacturing Company Inc. a/k/a Central Mfg. Co. of Illinois and Stealth Industries, Inc. ("Rentamark") a/k/a Rentamark a/k/a (collectively, "Defendants") alleging, among other things, that Defendants and their purported principal, Leo Stoller ("Stoller"), are engaged in a scheme of falsely claiming trademark rights for the purpose of attempting to extort money out of legitimate commercial actors. More specifically, Google alleges that Defendants aimed their continuing scheme in its direction by first seeking to oppose Google's application for registration of the "Google" trademark based upon a fraudulent claim of common law rights in or to that mark and then sending settlement communications to Google that offered to resolve the "registerability controversy" if Google would, among other things, agree to: (1) abandon its trademark application; (2) pay a 5% royalty for use of the "Google" mark; and (3) pay $100,000.00 to and acknowledge's exclusive ownership of the "Google" mark.

On December 20, 2005, Stoller filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). On motion of one of Stoller's creditors, Stoller's bankruptcy case, styled In re Stoller, No. 05-64075 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois (the "Bankruptcy Court"), was converted to a case under Chapter 7 of the Code on September 1, 2006. The property of Stoller's estate in bankruptcy includes, among other things, the stock and interests of incorporated and unincorporated businesses, including Stoller's wholly-owned interest in the Defendants. On September 6, 2006, the United States Trustee for Region 11 appointed Richard M. Fogel ("Trustee") as trustee to administer Stoller's estate in bankruptcy.

Stoller filed a Motion to Intervene in this action on February 6, 2007 arguing that: (1) he was the sole shareholder of Defendants; (2) he was the party that filed a petition for cancellation of the Google trademark registration; (3) he was the party that communicated with Google's counsel regarding the registerability controversy; (4) he was the party that claimed rights in and to the Google trademark; and (5) absent his involvement in this case, the corporate defendants would not be adequately represented. This Court denied Stoller's Motion, finding that he could not intervene as of right because he had no direct, significant legall interest in the litigation; first, because Stoller's companies had become part of his bankruptcy estate and therefore he held no interest in them, and second, because all his other assertions of right were contradicted by the record. In addition, this Court refused Stoller permissive intervention, noting Stoller's renown as a vexatious litigant and that his intervention would frustrate the parties' efforts to settle the matter. Thereafter, this Court approved a settlement agreed to by Google and entered a permanent injunction and final judgment. Stoller appealed both the denial of his Motion to Intervene and the final judgment.

The Seventh Circuit vacated the final judgment and remanded Stoller's Motion to Intervene for reconsideration, noting that Stoller's corporations seemed to be mere alter egos of Stoller. Additionally, it directed this Court to consider: 1) whether Central Manufacturing Inc. and Stealth Industries, Inc. are subject to suit, considering that the Bankruptcy Court found that the bankruptcy court "all but declared" that CFI and Stealth were alter egos of Stoller;" and 2) whether the bankruptcy estate and trustee were properly involved in the case. That is, Google had taken the position in the bankruptcy court that this case arose after the bankruptcy estate was created, and if that was the case, it should go to the debtor, rather than to his bankruptcy estate.

After remand, Stoller filed a supplement to his Motion to Intervene, noting the Seventh Circuit's opinion and taking the position that he should be allowed to intervene because his corporations were his alter egos but still were in no way "sham corporations." For the reasons stated below, this Court again denies Stoller's Motion to Intervene.


Under Rule 24 intervention may be as of right or it may be permissive. See Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Serv., Inc., 316 F.3d 694, 7000 (7th Cir. 2003). A party seeking to intervene as of right must satisfy four requirements: (1) the motion to intervene must be timely; (2) the party seeking to intervene must claim an interest related to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the party seeking to intervene must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the party's ability to protect that interest; and (4) the existing parties must not be adequate representatives of the applicant's interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a); see also Skokaogon Chippewa Cmty v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 945-46 (7th Cir. 2000). Failure to satisfy any one of the four requirements for intervention as of right is sufficient grounds to deny a motion to intervene. See United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2003). Determinations on motions to intervene are highly fact-specific. See Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1995) citing Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 1994). This Court must accept as true all non-conclusory allegations in the motion to intervene. See Id. citing Lake Investors Dev. Group v. Eglidi Dev. Group, 715 F.2d 1256, 1258 (7th Cir. 1983). A motion to intervene as of right should not be dismissed unless "it appears to an absolute certainty that the intervenor is not entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved under the complaint." Id.

A party seeking to intervene in a case must assert an interest in the action that is a "direct, significant legally protectible" one. Reich, 64 F.3d at 322 quoting Am. Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1989). In the Seventh Circuit, this inquiry focuses "on the issues to be resolved by the litigation and whether the potential intervenor has an interest in those issues." Id. citing Am. Nat'l Bank, 865 F.2d at 147.


Stoller alleges in his Motion to Intervene that he is the sole shareholder and sole employee of the Defendants. See Mtn. Intervene at 1, 3. In addition, he alleges that it was he personally on behalf of the Defendants who claimed rights to Google's trademark and brought the petition to cancel it. See Id. He further alleged that Google had previously petitioned the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay of litigation so that it could sue Stoller and that Google itself found that Stoller was an indispensable party to the proposed litigation. See Id. at 2. In support of this allegation, he attached an order from the Bankruptcy Court granting Google's motion for order declaring its proposed suit to be outside the scope of stay or in the alternative, modifying the stay. See Id. at 6-7.

In his Motion, Stoller directly references and relies on the factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court in its decision converting Stoller's Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding to a Chapter 7 proceeding. There the Bankruptcy Court made detailed factual findings regarding the relationship between Stoller and his various corporations and other entities. See In re Stoller, 351 B.R. 605, 611-616 (N.D.Ill. 2006). Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court found that: 1) Stoller made all decisions for the entities; 2) Stoller testified that he was the "actual, controlling entity;" 3) all the entities were operated by Stoller at the same address; 4) the entities did not keep corporate books or records of finances; 5) the entities had no record of dividend payments; 6) Stoller owned all stock in the entities; 7) the entities had no officers other than Stoller; 7) Stoller referred to the entities' assets as his personal assets; and 8) Stoller commingled funds from all of the entities as well as his personal funds in a single bank account. See Id. at 616-17. Based on these findings, the Bankruptcy Court found that Stoller and his businesses are "indistinguishable." See Id. at 616.

In addition, Google's Complaint takes the position that Stoller was Defendants' principal, used the Defendants to harass other companies, and was responsible for the actions taken against Google. Google asserts that Stoller was the CEO and sole shareholder of the Defendants and that "Stoller conducted the activities complained of in interstate commerce." See Cmplt. at 10. Many of their statements implicate one defendant "and Stoller" or allege that a Defendant acted "through Stoller." See, e.g., Cmplt. at 21 (c) ("Stoller initiated numerous proceedings in SI's name"); Cmplt. at 21(e) ("Stoller has obtained... the transfer of trademark Defendant Stealth and Defendant Central Mfg."); Cmplt. at 34-36 ("Central Mfg. And Stoller" opposed Google's trademark application and Stoller signed the related letters and purported settlement agreements). Google attached documents such as various letters signed by Stoller on behalf of Stealth Industries, a July 14, 2006 letter from the Trademark Office to Stoller ...

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