The opinion of the court was delivered by: Reagan, District Judge
Plaintiff Scott Ducey is a forty-one year old inmate who is currently incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"). On February 16, 2005, Ducey filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Farzana Siddiqui, M.D. and Christine Brown (Docs. 1 & 10). On March 28, 2008, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Brown (Doc. 52); therefore, the only remaining claim is against Dr. Siddiqui. Ducey alleges that Dr. Siddiqui violated his Eighth Amendment rights while was he was incarcerated at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center ("Pinckneyville") by being deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs (See Docs. 1, 84-3, p. 22).
Now before the Court is Dr. Siddiqui's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 73). On November 19, 2008, Ducey responded by sending medical records, declarations, and other documents dating back to 1999 (Doc. 84). At that time, Plaintiff informed the Court that he could not file a written response to the Defendant's motion because he was segregated from Menard's general population, and because the prison officials working at Menard prevented him from doing so (Doc. 83).
Having fully considered the parties' filings, the Court hereby GRANTS the Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 73).
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c); Haefling v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 169 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1999); Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe RailwayCo., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994). "The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The initial burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in dispute as to an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Delta Consulting Group, Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 2009). Once the moving party meets the burden, the non-moving party must come forward with evidence that establishes a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997); Estate of Stevens v. City of GreenBay, 105 F.3d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1997). Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the information before the court reveals a good faith dispute as to inferences to be drawn from those facts. Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 1997); Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1478 (7th Cir. 1994); Dempsey, 16 F.3d at 836. In deciding such a motion, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the opposing party is such that a reasonable jury might find in favor of that party after a trial.
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). See alsoCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Haefling, 169 F.3d at 497-98.
C. Background Facts and the Parties' Arguments
According to Plaintiff, his mental health problems began over ten years ago when a physician who is not associated with the Illinois Department of Corrections determined that Plaintiff had bipolar disorder, social anxiety disorder, and depression (Doc, 84-3, p. 23). He was hospitalized for depression at the age of twenty-seven, and claims to have a history of suicide attempts (Doc. 84-2, pp. 10-11, 22). As a result of these disorders, Plaintiff contends various physicians gave him prescriptions for Tegretol, Seroquel, and Zoloft, and he took those exact three medications for several years (Doc. 73-4, Deposition of Scott Ducey, p. 4).
Dr. Siddiqui first saw Plaintiff when he was transferred to Pinckneyville from another prison. She examined him soon after his arrival and diagnosed him with having a depressive disorder with alcohol abuse (Doc. 73-2, pp. 2-3). Plaintiff was in fact taking Tegretol, Seroquel, and Zoloft when Dr. Siddiqui initially examined him, so she continued to treat him with these medications for a short time (Id.). She soon determined, however, that Plaintiff did not need to take this combination of drugs and decided to change his medication to Trazadone (Doc. 73-2, p. 3). After later determining that Plaintiff had a "history of depressive disorders and self-reported anxiety" she changed his medication once again by prescribing him Vistaril (Id. at p. 5).
As a result of Dr. Siddiqui's decision to change the course of treatment to which Plaintiff had become used to, Plaintiff became upset (Doc. 84-3, p. 13; Doc. 73-4, pp. 3, 6). He complained to Defendant because Trazadone made him sleepy, and he complained about Imipramine*fn1 because it did not help him sleep (Doc. 73-4, p. 8; Doc. 73-2, p. 5). Plaintiff asked Dr. Siddiqui during one of his appointments why she could not treat him with Tegretol, Seroquel, and Zoloft (Doc. 73-2, pp. 5-6). Defendant eventually allowed Plaintiff to take Tegretol, but this decision still failed to satisfy Ducey because he then demanded to receive Zoloft (Doc. ...