Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Jones v. Feinerman

August 13, 2009

GREGORY JONES, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ADRIAN FEINERMAN, M.D., PAM GRUBMAN, AND DEBI MIDDENDORF, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Reagan, District Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

A. Introduction

Plaintiff Gregory Jones, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at the Pontiac Correctional Center, filed this action against the Defendants on April 27, 2006 (Doc. 1). Jones amended his complaint on May 14, 2007 (Doc. 32). With respect to Dr. Feinerman, Jones alleges that while Jones was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), Dr. Feinerman was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because he denied Jones treatment for the bone callouses in his feet, he caused an injury to Plaintiff's shoulder and refused to write Plaintiff a permit allowing him to be handcuffed in the front, and did not prescribe Tylenol for Plaintiff's shoulder pain (see Doc. 33). Jones also contends that Dr. Feinerman denied him this medical treatment in retaliation for his complaints about Dr. Feinerman and a state lawsuit he filed (Id.).

Now before the Court is Dr. Feinerman's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 53). Having fully considered the parties' filings, the Court hereby GRANTS Dr. Feinerman's motion for summary judgment.

B. Relevant Background Facts

While incarcerated at Menard, Plaintiff experienced a host of medical problems. His ailments included but were not limited to calluses, hypertension, vascular disease, and mental problems. Plaintiff first reported having calluses on both of his feet to Dr. Platt, another physician who practices at Menard (Doc. 53-2, ¶ 26). Dr. Platt determined that Plaintiff's calluses were recurrent and "severe" and ensured that they were trimmed on several occasions (Doc. 53-2, ¶ 48, 56). Dr. Krieg, another physician, also examined Plaintiff's callusses and similarly determined that they needed trimming (Doc. 53-2, ¶ 66). At times, due to the severity of the calluses on Plaintiff's feet, Plaintiff had a difficult time walking and was even issued a pumice stone (Doc. 53-2, ¶¶ 28, 48, 80).

Plaintiff complained to Dr. Feinerman about the calluses on his feet on January 25, 2006 (Id. at ¶ 88). Plaintiff told Dr. Feinerman that he wanted his calluses trimmed (Id.).Defendant examined Plaintiff but determined that trimming was not medically necessary at that time because Plaintiff was able to engage in activities such as weightlifting and playing football (Id. at ¶ 88, 157).

Dr. Feinerman next examined Plaintiff on February 21, 2006 (Id. at ¶ 90). To treat Plaintiff's vascular disease, Dr. Feinerman wrote out a prescription for Plaintiff to take HCTZ two times a day (Id.). Plaintiff also requested that the Defendant write him a pass that would allow Plaintiff to be handcuffed from the front. Two months before, another physician had denied Plaintiff's request for this same type of pass since Plaintiff's mobility was normal (Doc. 53-2, ¶ 83). Defendant similarly observed that Plaintiff was able to cross his wrists behind his back; therefore, he determined it was unnecessary for him to receive this pass (Id.).Plaintiff was supposed to see Dr. Feinerman again on March 7, 2006, about his blood pressure; however, Plaintiff refused to allow Dr. Feinerman to examine him (Id. at ¶ 91-92).

On October 13, 2006, Plaintiff was admitted to the prison's infirmary for observation due to hypertension and because Plaintiff stated he overdosed (Id. at ¶ 135). Upon Plaintiff's discharge from the infirmary, Dr. Feinerman ordered that no medication be given to him and that he was to have a follow up appointment with a doctor the next week (Id.).

On November 3, 2006, Defendant again prescribed Plaintiff HCTZ for hypertension and advised that Plaintiff needed to be re-checked in two weeks (Id. at ¶ 145). Plaintiff refused to take the medication Dr. Feinerman prescribed (Id. at ¶ 146). Plaintiff also wrote a letter to Dr. Feinerman and asked him to leave him alone and not to send him any more medication (Doc. 62-2, Exh. O). Plaintiff was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center on December 6, 2006, and Dr. Feinerman did not examine Plaintiff again (Id. at 154).

C. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c); Haefling v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 169 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1999); Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe RailwayCo., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994). "The judgment sought should be rendered "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 320 (1986). The initial burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in dispute as to an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Delta Consulting Group, Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 2009). Once the moving party meets the burden, the non-moving party must come forward with evidence that establishes a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997); Estate of Stevens v. City of GreenBay, 105 F.3d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1997). Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the information before the court reveals a good faith dispute as to inferences to be drawn from those facts. Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 1997); Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1478 (7th Cir. 1994); Dempsey, 16 F.3d at 836.

In deciding such a motion, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the opposing party is such that a reasonable jury might ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.