Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 06 C 264-G. Patrick Murphy, Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sykes, Circuit Judge.
Before KANNE, EVANS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
John Crichton, Jr., sued Golden Rule Insurance Company asserting three fraud-based claims. The district court dismissed one claim with preju-dice and gave Crichton an opportunity to replead the other two. That effort was unsuccessful; the district court held that the allegations in the remaining two claims failed to state a claim for relief and dismissed the case in its entirety. Crichton's appeal requires us to consider three questions: (1) whether Crichton had standing to bring a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (2006), and somewhat relatedly, whether he may maintain a claim under Florida's analog to that act, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.201 (West 2006); (2) whether Crichton adequately pleaded a claim for common-law fraud; and (3) whether Crichton adequately pleaded a RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) claim. We answer each question "no" and affirm the judgment of the district court.
Florida resident John Crichton began purchasing group health insurance from Golden Rule in 1995 under a master policy offered only to members of the Federation of American Consumers and Travelers ("the Federation"), a nonprofit organization that provided its members with (among other services) discounts on insurance through group-buying power. Crichton renewed his insurance every year through 2004. In 2002 he filed a complaint against Golden Rule in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, seeking to represent a nationwide class of Federation members who bought insurance from Golden Rule. His lawsuit alleged violations of the ICFA and, if his proposed class was certified, a host of other state consumer-fraud statutes. Crichton later amended his suit to add the Federation as a defendant. The Federation sought and received summary judgment in its favor and successfully defended that judgment on appeal. See Crichton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 832 N.E.2d 843, 851-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Crichton's claims against Golden Rule were dismissed without prejudice based on forum non conveniens. (Golden Rule is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana.)
Crichton next proceeded to the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois where he filed a complaint against Golden Rule under the diversity jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). He reasserted his claim for an alleged violation of the ICFA (and his class claim under the consumer-fraud statutes of other states) and also alleged a claim of common-law fraud. He later amended his complaint to include a third count, a RICO claim. The gist of all three claims was that Golden Rule had induced him to purchase insurance by an artificially low introductory premium and that Golden Rule failed to inform him that the cost of his renewal premiums would escalate dramatically because of Golden Rule's practice of closing blocks of insurance to new enrollees.
Golden Rule moved to dismiss Crichton's amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the motion with prejudice on the ICFA count but without prejudice on the common-law fraud and RICO counts. Crichton then filed his second amended complaint, repleading his common-law fraud and RICO allegations (this time with greater specificity in an effort to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)); he also repleaded, "for the record," the ICFA claim. Golden Rule once again moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed Crichton's common-law fraud and RICO claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim, ignored the already dismissed-with-prejudice ICFA claim, and entered final judgment in favor of Golden Rule.
We review the district court's order dismissing Crichton's claims de novo. St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007), and will affirm the dismissal if he did not plead "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addition, Crichton's fraud-based claims are subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements, which means that the circumstances constituting the fraud must be pleaded "with particularity." FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
As an initial matter, the parties debate whether the amended or second amended complaint is the operative complaint for review. As we have noted, after the district court dismissed the ICFA count in the amended complaint with prejudice, Crichton repleaded it in his second amended complaint "for the record," adding certain facts and rearranging the nature of his individual and class claims under the Florida statutory analog. On appeal Golden Rule argues that the facts Crichton added in the second amended complaint are out of bounds on our review of the earlier dismissed-with-prejudice ICFA claim, citing Tricontinental Industries, Ltd. v. Price-waterhouseCoopers, LLP,475 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007).
In Tricontinental, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint, and while that motion was pending, the plaintiffs sought and obtained leave to file a second amended complaint adding two new claims. The plaintiffs' second amended complaint, however, not only added the proposed new claims but also supplemented the allegations in the original claims. In dismissing the claims asserted in the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the district court declined to consider the supplemental allegations in the second amended complaint because leave to replead those original claims had not been granted. The court later dismissed the additional claims in the second amended complaint. On appeal we confined our review of the dismissed claims from the first amended complaint to the allegations in that complaint, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that we should consider the supplemental allegations contained in the second amended complaint. Id. at 838 n.8. We reasoned that because the district court had only granted leave to add two new claims, not to replead the original claims, it would be inappropriate to consider on appeal the supplemental allegations contained in the second amended complaint. Id.
This case is similar. The ICFA claim in Crichton's amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice; Crichton was granted leave to replead only his common-law fraud and RICO claims. Repleading (and attempting to bolster) his ICFA claim in the second amended com- plaint "for the record" was thus gratuitous, and the district court was within its discretion to ignore it. Accordingly, we will review the common-law fraud and RICO allegations contained in ...