The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wayne R. Andersen United States District Judge
Wayne R. Andersen District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the court on the motion  of defendants Scott Schweiger, Tiffany Augustyn, Kimberly Oppedisano, Thomas Pufpaf (collectively "defendant officers") and Phillip Cline ("Cline") to dismiss certain counts of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to require a more definite statement as to other counts of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Counts III, IV, and VII and with respect to all claims against Cline. The motion to require a more definite statement with respect to a number of other counts is denied.
In October 2008, pro se plaintiff Richard Black filed a seven-count complaint against defendants. The allegations in the complaint stem from an October 2006 incident in which the plaintiff was arrested by defendants Chicago Police Officers Augustyn and Oppedisano. Compl. ¶ 6. Following his arrest, plaintiff was charged with patronizing a prostitute and public indecency. Id. at ¶ 7. Also arrested and charged at this time was Andrea Delgado, a suspected prostitute who allegedly agreed to render sexual services for plaintiff in exchange for a monetary sum. Id. at ¶ 9. The charges against plaintiff initially were approved by defendant Officers Pufpaf and Schweiger. Id. at ¶ 9. Following plaintiff's plea of not guilty, however, these charges were stricken by the City of Chicago. Id. at ¶ 11.
Plaintiff asserts a right to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from this series of events. Id. at ¶ 3. In particular, plaintiff alleges he was proceeded against by false evidence (Count I), unlawfully seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (Count II), denied the right to free association in violation of the First Amendment (Count III), subjected to extensive detention without due process (Count IV), compelled to incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment (Count V), questioned without counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment (Count VI) and denied equal protection of the law (Count VII). Id. at ¶ 6-41.
On March 31, 2009 defendants filed a motion to dismiss certain counts of plaintiff's complaint, specifically (1) Count III, free association (2) Count IV, due process (3) Count VII, equal protection and (4) all claims against defendant Phillip Cline. Defendants also moved for a more definite statement with respect to (1) Count I, false evidence (2) Count V, compelled self-incrimination and (3) Count VI, right to counsel. We now turn to these respective motions.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007))." A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint must be construed in a light favorable to the plaintiff and the court must accept all material facts alleged in the complaint as true. Jackson v. E.J. Branch Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 1999). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Additionally, a complaint must describe the claim with sufficient detail as to "give the defendants fair notice of what the.claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). However, a complaint does not need to set forth all relevant facts or recite the law. Rather, all that is required is "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1996).
A. Count III -- Free Association
Count III alleges that defendant officers violated plaintiff's First Amendment right to free association by limiting his ability to interact freely with Andrea Delgado. Compl. ¶ 17-21. The First Amendment, however, creates no all-encompassing general right to free association. Instead, the Supreme Court has held that constitutional protection for association exists only when an individual (1) has chosen to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships or (2) is engaged in protected speech or religious activities. See Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). ...