The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge James B. Zagel
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants in this action are guarantors of a commercial loan made by Plaintiff, GE Business Financial Services Inc. ("GE"), to Promenade at Litchfield, LLC ("Promenade") for the purpose of financing a construction project in South Carolina. GE brought this action for breach of Defendants' payment and performance obligations under the guaranties. Defendants now move to stay this action pending resolution of related actions in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, or, in the alternative, to transfer this action to that court. For the following reasons, I grant Defendants' motion to stay this action and deny Defendants' alternative motion to transfer the action to the District of South Carolina.
II. Statement of Relevant Facts
On July 13, 2007, GE entered into a loan agreement with Promenade to finance construction of a shopping center on property located in South Carolina. As a condition to the loan, Defendants executed two guaranties in which they guaranteed payment of the loan and performance of Promenade's obligations in the event that Promenade defaulted on the loan agreement. Both of the guaranties name Illinois law as the governing law and both indicate that they were negotiated and delivered in the state of Illinois.
Two actions have been filed in the District of South Carolina in connection with the construction project and the loan agreement. These two actions were filed separately, but subsequently combined because of the similarity of the issues. In the first action, filed on August 29, 2008, Promenade alleges that GE breached the loan agreement by failing to disperse funds as scheduled according to the terms of the agreement. In response, GE claims that Promenade, not GE, first defaulted on the agreement and that its suspension of loan funds was contractually proper. In the second action, filed on November 4, 2008, GE moves to foreclose on the property because of Promenade's alleged default on the loan agreement. In the present action, GE alleges that Defendants breached obligations under both the payment and performance guaranties and requests repayment of funds dispersed under the loan agreement, interest on these sums, and attorneys' fees. In response to GE's complaint, Defendants have moved to stay this action pending resolution of the South Carolina actions. In the alternative, Defendants move to transfer the action to the District of South Carolina.
Defendants first move to stay this proceeding pending the results of the actions in the District of South Carolina. When related cases are pending in two federal courts, each of those courts has the power to stay the proceedings before it in deference to the related action. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Metropolis Capital Group, No. 90 C 5845, 1991 WL 212112, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 1991). "[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). In deciding whether to enter such a stay, I may consider the following factors: (1) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage the non-moving party, (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and streamline the trial, and (3) whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court. Arrivalstar S.S. v. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co., No. 08 c 1086, 2008 WL 2940807, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2008).
In bringing this suit, GE complains that Defendants failed to make payments and to perform according to the terms of the two guaranties. GE also claims that Defendants' obligations to act pursuant to the guaranties were triggered by Promenade's default against the loan agreement. Because the consolidated District of South Carolina actions also turn on the question of whether Promenade breached its obligations under the loan agreement, a stay of this action pending the determination in that district of whether a default occurred would eliminate the need for the parties to argue, and this court to decide, the same central issue. This would serve to both simplify the issues in this case as well as reduce the burden of litigation on both the parties and this court.*fn1
GE's argument in opposition to Defendants' motion to stay relies on four cases in which courts have refused to enter stays of federal cases on guaranty agreements in deference to state court suits between lenders and borrowers (and one in which a federal court refused to stay a case between a lender and a borrower in favor of a state court suit on a guaranty agreement). See Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank, Ltd. v. First Nat'l Realty & Dev. Co., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1007, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Fofi Hotel Co., Inc. v. Davfra Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1345, 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Bank of Montreal v. McKenzie Methane Corp., No. 93 C 3610, 1993 WL 420985, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1993); RepublicBank Dallas Nat'l Assoc. v. McIntosh, 828 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1987); Bank of New York v. Bin Saud, 628 F. Supp. 474, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). GE claims that because the parties and the actions in the South Carolina cases are not sufficiently parallel to those in this case, I cannot grant a stay of this action. Each of the decisions that GE relies upon applied the Colorado River doctrine, an abstention doctrine that typically comes into play where parallel litigation is being carried in federal and state court proceedings. See generally Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). However, when a party moves for a stay in one federal action in favor of another concurrent federal action, the deciding court has far more discretion in determining whether or not to grant the stay. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1233 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he circumstances justifying federal court deferral to a state proceeding are still considerably more limited than the circumstances permitting federal court deferral to another federal court."); accord Overton v. Gonzalez, No 3:07CV1110(AWT), 2008 WL 1846319, at *1 (D. Conn. April 24, 2008); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Neadle, 861 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ("Where two federal weighs slightly in favor of granting Defendants' motion to courts with concurrent jurisdiction are involved, however, the movant need not demonstrate compelling need for a stay, . . . it must demonstrate merely that the stay is appropriate"); DeVona v. City of Providence, 652 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D. R.I. 1987); United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 416 (D. Md. 1985) ("The principles governing contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdiction are more deferential when both courts involved are federal than they are when a federal court is asked to stay its hand in favor of a state-court proceeding.").
Accordingly, I need not conclude that the action before me is parallel or identical to the actions inthe District of South Carolina in order to stay this action pending determination of default in the consolidated cases. Because I find that a stay of this action would both streamline a trial in this case and reduce the burden of litigation upon the parties and the court, I grant Defendants' motion to stay this proceeding.
Defendants move in the alternative to transfer this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the District of South Carolina, where it might be consolidated with the two previous actions filed there.*fn2 "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) places discretion with the court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986). In order to grant a motion for transfer, I must find that (1) venue is proper in both the transferor and transferee court; (2) transfer is for the convenience of the parties and witnesses; and (3) transfer will serve the interests of justice. Id. The movant "has the burden of establishing, by reference to particular circumstances, that the transferee ...