The opinion of the court was delivered by: Elaine E. Bucklo United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brought a three count complaint asserting violations of the consent decree entered in Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 481 F.Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (Count I), violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626 ("ADEA") (Count II), and "punitive discharge" (Count III) against all defendants.*fn1 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint*fn2 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and moved for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. This opinion resolves both motions, as well as plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint.
Plaintiff was an Assistant State's Attorney employed by defendant Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County ("OSA") from January of 1997 to February of 2007. At a meeting on February 16, 2007, when plaintiff was fifty-seven years old, defendants Murphy and Murray informed plaintiff that her employment was being terminated as a result of budget cuts mandated by defendant Cook County Board of Commissioners (the "Board"). Plaintiff claims that the proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. She does not dispute that OSA reduced its workforce as a result of countywide budget cuts. She alleges, however, that she was selected for termination over less qualified or equally qualified peers based on 1) her lack of a "political sponsor" with sufficient "clout" to have her name removed from the termination list; 2) her age; and 3) her refusal to go along with an alleged unlawful scheme proposed by defendant Cassidy in August of 2006.
Defendants argue that defendants Alvarez and OSA are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that defendant Board is a non-suable entity. On these grounds, they seek dismissal of all claims against these defendants. Defendants also argue that plaintiff's Shakman claim, which seeks a monetary award for asserted violations of the consent decree entered in Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 481 F.Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979), should be dismissed against all defendants because 1) individual defendants cannot be held liable for violations of the Shakman order, and 2) the Shakman order does not provide a legal basis for a damages claim. Finally, defendants argue that the ADEA claim must be dismissed against the individual defendants because individual supervisors who are not otherwise employers cannot be sued under ADEA. Defendants seek sanctions on the grounds that plaintiff objectively lacked a reasonable basis for bringing any of these claims against the state agent defendants, for bringing the Shakman and ADEA claims against the individual defendants, and for bringing the "fictional" claim of punitive discharge.
II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, not its merits. Gibson v. Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). I must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. McMillan v. Collection Prof'ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff must, nevertheless, allege sufficient factual material to suggest plausibly that she is entitled to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
A. The Board as Defendant
Plaintiff concedes that defendant Board is a non-suable entity and joins defendants' motion to dismiss all claims against this defendant. The joint motion is granted.
B. Plaintiff's "Punitive Discharge" Claim Plaintiff concedes that this count does not state a cause of action and joins defendants' motion to dismiss Count III in its entirety. The joint motion is granted.
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants rely primarily on Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1994), for their argument that defendants Alvarez and OSA are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit held:
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from deciding suits brought by private litigants against states or their agencies, and that prohibition extends to state officials acting in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Whether a particular official is the legal equivalent of the State itself is a question of that State's law, Santiago v. Daley, 744 F.Supp. 845, 845 & n. 1 (N.D.Ill.1990), and the Illinois Supreme Court decided in 1990 that State's Attorneys are state officials. Ingemunson v. Hedges, 133 Ill.2d 364, 140 Ill.Dec. 397, 400, 549 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (1990) (State's Attorneys are state, not county, officials).
Id. at 969. Plaintiff does not deny that under Garcia, all of her claims against OSA and Alvarez are barred; she simply argues that Garcia was wrongly decided. I am not at liberty to disregard controlling precedent, however, and plaintiff advances no colorable ...