The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Blanche M. Manning
Defendant Helen Hawkins faces one count of embezzling from a Chicago charter school that focuses on at-risk teenagers. Specifically, the indictment alleges that while principal of Triumphant Charter School, Hawkins had use of a school-issued American Express credit card, but instead of limiting her purchases to school-related items, she also used the card for personal expenses exceeding$5,000. She has filed numerous pretrial motions. For the reasons stated, each motion is denied.
Hawkins asks the court to order the government to file a bill of particulars containing: (1) the exact time and date of each criminal occurrence; and (2) the exact street address and any physical description of the location of the occurrences. An indictment is legally sufficient if it provides enough information to (1) state each element of the crime charged, (2) provide adequate notice of the nature of the charges so that defendant can prepare a defense, and (3) preclude a second prosecution for the same offense. See United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 446-47 (7th Cir. 2003). In determining whether the indictment sufficiently sets forth the elements of the offense, relevant factors include: (1) the complexity of the charged offense; (2) the clarity of the indictment; and (3) the degree of discovery available in the absence of a bill of particulars. United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 923, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2003). However, the indictment does not need to allege "every factual nugget necessary for conviction." United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 2000). "Once the elements of the crime have been specified, an indictment need only provide enough factual information to enable the defendants to identify the conduct on which the government intends to base its case." Fassnacht, 332 F.3d at 446.
The court has reviewed the superseding indictment and, in its discretion, agrees with the government that the indictment sufficiently sets forth the elements of the offense as to allow Hawkins to conduct her own investigation and prepare her defense. The indictment clearly alleges that Hawkins "did knowingly embezzle, steal, obtain by fraud, and otherwise without authority convert to her own use and the use of others, more than $5,000 in funds owned by and under the care, custody, or control of" Triumphant. It also alleges that the conduct occurred during the calendar year 2004, and that Hawkins' crime allegedly involved the use of an American Express card that was issued to her for making school-related purchases. It appears from Hawkins' motion that she believes she is also entitled to the exact date, time, and place of each of her allegedly illegal uses of her school's money. But, as discussed above, "[t]he defendant's constitutional right is to know the offense with which he is charged, not to know the details of how it will be proved." United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 135 (7th Cir. 1981).
For these reasons, Hawkins pretrial motion for a bill of particulars is denied.
B. Pre-Trail Production of List of Witnesses
Next, Hawkins ask the court to order the government to provide her with the names and addresses of all of its witnesses. Neither the Constitution nor Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 requires the government to provide a defendant in a non-capital case with a list of all prospective witnesses. See United States v. Braxton, 877 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1989). However, the court may order the government to produce such a list if the defendant identifies a particularized need for it. See United States v. Patel, No. 01 CR 716, 2002 WL 1750948, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2002).
In her motion, Hawkins has failed to offer any reason for needing the government's list of witnesses. Accordingly, she has not identified a particularized need for the information requested and the request is therefore denied.
C. Motion for Witness Statements
Hawkins has also moved for the disclosure of government witnesses' statements pursuant to the Jencks Act. See 18 U.S.C. §3500. Under the Jencks Act, the government must turn over to the defendant statements or reports made by government witnesses, but only after that witness has testified on direct examination at the defendant's trial. Id. The government has nevertheless agreed to provide Hawkins with witness statements and reports two weeks before trial. Accordingly, because the government has agreed (without being required to do so) to provide Hawkins with witness statements two weeks before trial, the pretrial motion is denied as unnecessary.
Next, Hawkins moves for the disclosure of her own statements as well as the statements of co-defendants, relevant documents and objects, reports of examinations and tests, and any other materials the government must produce ...