The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On May 14, 2008, Plaintiff Allen L. Moore, through appointed counsel, filed a three-count Amended Complaint alleging an excessive force claim (Count I), a denial of adequate medical care claim (Count II), and a conditions of confinement claim (Count III) against certain employees of the Illinois Department of Human Services Treatment and Detention Facility. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Thomas Monahan, Darrell Sanders, Tarry Williams, Bernard M. Akpan, and Tammy Chasteen filed the present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' partial summary judgment motion and denies Defendants' motion to strike as moot. The only remaining claim in this lawsuit is Moore's excessive force claim as alleged in Count I of the Amended Complaint against Defendants Sanders, Graham, Williams, Cleveland, Hogan, Humphrey, and Burnette.
I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1
When determining summary judgment motions, the Court derives the background facts from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements. Specifically, Local Rule 56.1 assists the Court by "organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence." Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000). Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue." Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving party to admit or deny every factual statement proffered by the moving party and to concisely designate any material facts that establish a genuine dispute for trial. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). In addition, Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) requires the nonmoving party to present a separate statement of additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment. See Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008). In short, the nonmoving party must set forth its material facts in a separate statement -- not in its Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) responses to the moving party's statement of facts. See id. at 643 ("court does not abuse its discretion when it opts to disregard facts presented in a manner that does follow the Rule's instructions").
The purpose of Rule 56.1 statements is to identify the relevant evidence supporting the material facts, not to make factual or legal arguments. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006). A litigant's failure to respond to a Local Rule 56.1 statement results in the Court admitting the uncontroverted statement as true. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006). The requirements for responses under Local Rule 56.1 are "not satisfied by evasive denials that do not fairly meet the substance of the material facts asserted."
Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 528. Moreover, the Court may disregard statements and responses that do not properly cite to the record. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C. 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A district court does not abuse its discretion when, in imposing a penalty for a litigant's non-compliance with Local Rule 56.1, the court chooses to ignore and not consider the additional facts that a litigant has proposed"). With these standards in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts of this case.
Moore is in the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") on parole from the Department of Corrections ("IDOC") awaiting the determination of his civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act ("SVP Act"), 725 ILCS 207/1, et seq. (R. 185-1, Defs.' Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts ¶ 1.) From July 12, 2005 until December 27, 2005, Moore resided at the DHS Treatment and Detention Center ("TDF") in Joliet, Illinois and currently resides at the TDF in Rushville, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 2.) On November 7, 2006, Moore filed a pro se Complaint and on January 10, 2008, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss. (R. 1-1, Compl.; R. 130-1, Mem., Op. and Order.) Shortly thereafter, the Court granted Moore's motion for appointment of counsel. (R. 133-1.) On May 14, 2008, Moore, by counsel, filed an Amended Complaint. (R. 149-1.) On December 22, 2008, Defendants filed the present partial summary judgment motion. (R. 183-1.)
From September 2005 until March 2007, Monahan was the Acting Director of the TDF. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 3.) From January 2004 until September 2007, Sanders was TDF's Director of Security. (Id. ¶ 4.) Also during the relevant time period, Williams was an Internal Investigator at the TDF, who was temporarily assigned as an Executive II, and both Akpan and Graham were Executive II at the Joliet TDF. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 7.) Timothy Burnette, Tony Humphrey, and Leslie Hogan were Security Therapist Aides ("STA") II at the Joliet TDF. (Id. ¶¶ 8 10, 11.) Meanwhile, Chasteen and Defendant Shawndo Cleveland were STAs. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.)
On December 19, 2005, Emergency Response Team ("ERT") staff removed Moore from his room on the A wing of the Joliet TDF. (Id. ¶ 19.) At 3:30 p.m. that same day, ERT staff took Moore to the Health Care Unit ("HCU") of the Joliet TDF due to a cut on his face and abrasions. (Id. ¶ 20.) At that time, Moore's blood pressure was 153/82. (R. 192-1, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. Add'l Facts ¶ 66.) After they treated him for his cuts and abrasions, which was around 3:50 p.m, Moore, who was accompanied by STAs, walked to the observation room on the A wing of the Joliet TDF. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 22.) While in the observation room, Moore maintains that he asked Chasteen for assistance because of his dizziness and pain to no avail. (Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 68.) By 5:50 p.m., Moore's blood pressure had risen to 156/88. (Id. ¶ 66.) Thereafter, STA Kenneth Tyler observed Moore slide to the floor in the observation room. (Id. ¶ 69; Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 23.) Two nurses from the HCU staff then arrived in the A wing, as well as Akpan and Williams. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 27, 29.) The nurses determined that Moore needed to go back to the HCU, after which one nurse and DHS staff members placed Moore in a wheelchair and took him to the HCU where staff provided medical treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment motions, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, ...