The opinion of the court was delivered by: Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On July 3, 2008, Plaintiff Samuel Ivy ("Ivy") filed a ten-count Complaint against Defendant Police Officers Powers, Caballero, Kinsellas, Lara and McKenna (collectively "Defendant Officers"), and Defendant City of Chicago (the "City") (collectively "Defendants") alleging § 1983 False Arrest (Count I); State law-False Arrest (Count II); State law-Malicious Prosecution (Count III); § 1983 Conspiracy Claim (Count IV); State law-Conspiracy Claim (Count V); § 1983 Unlawful Search of Residence (Count VI); § 1983 Unlawful Seizure of Property (Count VII); § 1983 Equal Protection-Class of One (Count VIII); State law-Indemnification (745 ILCS 10/9-102) (Count IX); and Respondeat Superior (Count X). Counts I through VIII charge the Defendant Officers. Counts IX and X charge the City. Defendants moved this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Ivy's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or in the alternative, for more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). For the reasons stated, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement is denied.
The following facts are taken as true, as the Court is required to do at the motion to dismiss stage. See Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1995). On or about July 10, 2006, Defendant Officers entered the home and placed him under arrest for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Compl. ¶ 5. Defendant Officers did not have a search warrant to enter Ivy's home and there were no exigent circumstances present to justify their entry. Compl. ¶ 55. Once inside, Defendant Officers proceeded to search Ivy's home without probable cause. Compl. ¶ 56. During the search Defendant Officers seized and destroyed Ivy's property without legal justification and arrested Ivy. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 59. Defendant Officers did not observe Ivy commit any criminal activity nor did they have probable cause to arrest him. Compl. ¶ 55.
Defendant Officers agreed together to arrest and charge Ivy without probable cause, agreed to not report each other for doing so, and then generated false documentation to cover up their misconduct. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16. In doing so, Defendant Officers did not enforce the laws equally and fairly towards Ivy. Compl. ¶ 17. Ivy asserts that he was intentionally treated differently as a result of having a potential claim against Defendant Officers and as a result of witnessing Defendant Officers' misconduct. Compl. ¶ 18. Ivy was treated with ill will and discriminated against with no rational basis. Compl. ¶ 18. Ivy asserts that he was similarly situated to other individuals arrested by the Defendant Officers who did not have false evidence or false reports generated against them. Compl. ¶ 18. Defendant Officers have all arrested over twenty individuals prior to Ivy's arrest on July 10, 2006. On none of these occasions has any of the Defendant Officers ever falsified police reports or criminal complaints. Compl. ¶¶ 19-21, 23-24, 26-27, 29-30, 32-33, 35-36. On July 10, 2006, there was no reasonable reason for Defendant Officers to falsify Ivy's police reports or criminal complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 28, 31, 34, 37.
On November 9, 2006, the States' Attorney handling Ivy's criminal case dismissed the charges against him. Compl. ¶ 47-48.*fn1
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1995). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff need not allege all facts involved in the claim. See Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994). However, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the claim must be supported by facts that, if taken as true, at least plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). Such a set of facts must "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of illegality. Id. at 1965.
I. State Law Claims (Counts II, III, V, XI and X)
A. Counts II, III and V (False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution and Conspiracy)
Counts II, III and V of Ivy's Complaint allege state law claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution and conspiracy respectively. The statute of limitations applicable to Ivy's state law claims is one year. 745 ILCS 10/8-101 et seq. (West 2006) ("No civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued."); see Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 2005) ([T]he one-year [statute of limitations] period applies to state-law claims that are joined with a § 1983 claim.").
Here, Ivy alleges he was arrested on July 10, 2006. The Cook County State's Attorney's Office moved to dismiss his criminal case on November 9, 2006. Therefore, at best, Ivy's state law causes of action for false arrest, malicious prosecution and conspiracy began to accrue on November 9, 2006. Since Ivy's Complaint was not filed until July 3, 2008, twenty-months after the disposition of his criminal case, he is well beyond the one-year statute of limitations period set out ...