The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
This matter is now before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Darwyn Robinson ("Officer Robinson"), Rusty Hoker ("Sergeant Hoker"), Kirk Pattison ("Officer Pattison"), and Roy Melton ("Officer Melton"). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss [#16] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On March 10, 2007, Officer Robinson and Officer Cary of the Rock Island Police Department detained Plaintiff's niece, LaCarsha Gay, Elizabeth Richards, and Shanika Jackson ("Jackson") during a traffic stop.*fn1 LaCarsha phoned Plaintiff, Marcus Gay ("Gay"), came to the scene and found the women already sitting in the back of a squad car. He asked Officer Cary why the women were being arrested and was told that Officer Cary did not know what each of them would be charged with. Gay then asked what probable cause there was to search and seize the women and was told that Officer Cary did not know. Gay called the Rock Island Police Department and reported what he perceived to be the illegal search and arrest of the women.
Sergeant Hoker arrived on the scene. Officer Robinson approached Sergeant Hoker and told him that Gay had obstructed the arrest of Jackson. Sergeant Hoker placed Gay in handcuffs, read him his Miranda warnings, and placed him in the back of Officer Pattison's squad car. Officer Pattison then transported him to the Rock Island County Jail, where he was searched, booked, and placed in a cell.
On March 13, 2007, Officer Melton stated under oath that Gay had obstructed Officer Pattison from arresting Jackson. Defendant William Kalinak ("Kalinak"), an Assistant State's Attorney, charged Gay with obstructing the performance of a police officer by repeatedly demanding information from the officers on the scene concerning Jackson's arrest and refusing verbal commands to stop demanding information and leave the immediate area.
On June 19, 2008, Gay filed his Complaint alleging: (1) a claim for false arrest and false imprisonment against Officers Robinson, Hocker, and Pattison; (2) a claim against Officer Melton for initiating a malicious prosecution; and (3) a claim against ASA Kalinak for malicious prosecution.*fn2 Defendants Robinson, Hocker, Pattison, and Melton have now moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Gay has filed his response, and this Order follows.
Since Gay is representing himself pro se, the Court will construe the complaint liberally and will not hold it "to the stringent standards expected of pleadings drafted by lawyers." McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F. 3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000). "Therefore, a pro se civil rights complaint may only be dismissed if it is beyond a doubt that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff could obtain relief." Id.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; its well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, and all reasonably-drawn inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997); M.C.M. Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 1995); Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1992).
A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984). However, a complaint need not plead legal theory, nor need it match facts to every element of a legal theory. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit has recently emphasized the "limited analysis appropriate on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998). General allegations of elements of a claim, unsupported by factual allegations in support, are sufficient to satisfy the "minimal requirements of federal notice pleading." Id. at 328.
If the plaintiff's claim as pled, however, is "without legal consequence," dismissal is proper. Grzan v. Charter Hospital, 104 F.3d 116, 119 (7th Cir. 1997). One of the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) is to eliminate actions that are fatally flawed in their legal premises and are destined to fail, thus sparing litigants the burdens of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity. Advanced ...