The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Joan H. Lefkow
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises out of an eight-count complaint filed by plaintiff DSM Desotech, Inc. ("Desotech") against its competitors 3D Systems Corporation and 3D Systems, Inc. (collectively, "3DS" or "defendants") for violations of federal antitrust law, state antitrust law, state tort law, and federal patent law. Before the court are two motions brought by 3DS. First, 3DS moves to stay discovery on all antitrust and state law claims pending the outcome of its motion to dismiss such claims. Second, 3DS moves to bifurcate the patent liability and patent damages issues of the willful infringement claim filed against it and, additionally, to stay discovery of patent damages until liability has been determined. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to stay discovery on the antitrust claims [#46] will be granted, and defendants' motion to bifurcate trial and stay discovery on the patent claims [#48] will be denied.
3DS is a manufacturer of large-frame stereolithography ("SL") machines. SL is a process by which a physical object, such as a model, is created layer by layer from liquid resin that is solidified into shape with a laser. Desotech is a leader in the SL resin market and the holder of two equipment patents allegedly covering the resin recoating technology used in eight of the SL machines produced and sold by 3DS. In addition to their claim of willful patent infringement (Count VIII), Desotech has alleged anticompetitive behavior on the part of 3DS in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, section 3 of the Clayton Act, the Illinois Antitrust Act, and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Counts I--VII). Desotech further alleges that 3DS has tortiously interfered with its prospective economic advantages in violation of Illinois law (Count VII).
3DS has denied liability, raising several affirmative defenses to the patent infringement alleged in Count VIII. Also, in a separate motion, 3DS has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all antitrust and state law claims filed against it in Counts I--VII.
In the present two motions, 3DS seeks to alter the ordinary course of discovery on all eight counts by asking the court (1) to stay discovery on the antitrust and state law claims pending the outcome of its motion to dismiss, and (2) to bifurcate the patent claim, yielding separate trials on patent liability and patent damages and, additionally, to stay discovery of patent damages until such time as liability has been determined.
I. Motion to Stay Discovery of Antitrust and State Law Claims
District courts enjoy extremely broad discretion in controlling discovery. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed. 2d 759 (1998); Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2002). In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a court may limit the scope of discovery or control its sequence in order to "protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Britton, 523 U.S. at 598.Such a motion will only be granted, however, "for good cause" and after the moving party has certified to the court that it "has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); N.D. Ill. L.R. 37.2.
Accordingly, the mere filing of the motion does not automatically stay discovery. SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 852 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir. 1988). Nor does it mean that a court will automatically grant a stay pursuant to Rule 26(c) simply because a defendant asks for one. In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation,231 F.R.D. 331, 336 (N.D. III. 2005). Nevertheless, stays are granted with some frequency. Id. Courts may limit discovery in myriad situations, including when a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), but in a majority of cases the existence of a dispositive motion is not the sole reason for granting the stay. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. BTA Branded, Inc., No. 05 C 6673, 2007 WL 3256848, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007). Stays are often deemed appropriate where the motion to dismiss can resolve a threshold issue such as jurisdiction, standing, or qualified immunity or where, in cases such as this one, discovery may be especially burdensome and costly to the parties. See id. at *1--2; In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1826, 2007 WL 2127577, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007).
3DS has certified that it was unable to resolve this dispute with Desotech, which has submitted a motion to compel discovery on antitrust issues since the present motion to stay was first filed. The only issue remaining, therefore, is whether 3DS has shown good cause for the stay.*fn1 In its complaint, Desotech has alleged three separate theories of liability on which it might proceed with its federal antitrust claims: illegal tying under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act, restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Desotech has also alleged two state law antitrust claims that may or may not ultimately overlap with the federal antitrust claims.
As the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, and this court have all recognized, discovery in any antitrust case can quickly become enormously expensive and burdensome to defendants. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007) ("[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.") (citations omitted); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1978) (acknowledging that "antitrust trials often encompass a great deal of expensive and time consuming discovery"); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by designation) (requiring that "some threshold of plausibility . . . be crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase"). Where, as here, not one, but multiple independent theories of antitrust liability have been presented, the potential burden on defendants will likely be even higher, as the scope of discovery must be further broadened to encompass each type of anticompetitive action alleged.
Recognition by the courts of the hefty costs associated with antitrust discovery is not, as Desotech correctly points out, tantamount to an automatic prohibition on discovery in every antitrust case where defendants challenge the sufficiency of a complaint. Such recognition does, however, suggest that the court should be particularly mindful of the course of discovery it will authorize in antitrust cases.
Here, 3DS is facing potential liability on six separate antitrust claims. The business records 3DS has been asked to produce span a period of at least eight years of activity. See Defs.' Memo in Support of Mot. to Bifurcate (Dkt. No. 50), Ex. A, at 11.*fn2 More importantly, the information 3DS has been asked to disclose includes "every 3D Systems sales contract for four different 3D Systems stereolithography machines; every sales and marketing document for all 3D Systems stereolithography machines; large categories of third-party contracts; technical designs, manufacturing drawings and test results; complex financial records and reports; vast amounts of customer data, including every piece of communication with customers and potential customers," as well as other internal communications-information that, in addition to ...