Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Haider v. Kellogg

September 30, 2008

ARHGA HAIDER D/B/A AMIGO SEAFOOD & STEAK HOUSE, INC. AND RUBES SPORT BAR, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ERIC KELLOGG, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF HARVEY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Chief Judge James F. Holderman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CORRECTED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

On June 9, 2004, City of Harvey police officers entered and searched a business owned by plaintiff Agha Haider ("Haider").*fn1 As a result, Haider filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against the Mayor of the City of Harvey, Eric Kellogg; Mayor Kellogg's brother and alleged "Chief of Mayor's Marshals," Derrick Muhammad; T. Myers; Dreina Lewis; Detective Harris; and Other Unknown Marshals, alleging in pertinent part that ten unknown Marshals, acting at Kellogg's direction, unlawfully executed a warrantless search and seizure of Haider's property and beat Haider up after he had been arrested. Haider also alleged that Kellogg, acting in concert with Lewis, wrongfully withheld renewal of his liquor license. Before this court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Kellogg, Muhammad, Myers, and Lewis [151]. For the reasons stated herein, that motion is granted.

Background

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this court must consider the facts properly before it in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all doubts in the non-moving party's favor. Keri v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 629 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore, in considering the defendants' motion the court will review the facts properly before it and draw all reasonable inferences in Haider's favor.

A. The Facts

In his Response to Defendants' 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts [226], Haider contested many of the defendants' stated facts. Haider, however, did not comply with Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) in that Haider did not file "a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." See N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(C). Consequently, the only facts properly before the court are those presented in Defendants' 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Material Facts [153], which are as follows:

Haider was the owner of Rube's Sports Bar located at 611 East 157th Street, Harvey, Illinois. (Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10.) On June 9, 2004, the City of Harvey police department received an anonymous tip that Rube's was operating as a strip club and that prostitution was occurring on the premises. (Id. ¶ 19.) The police department was also informed that Rube's did not have a valid City of Harvey business license or entertainment license. (Id. ¶ 20.) Acting on the tip, Officer Henry Harris and Officer Antione Anderson went to Rube's in plain clothes, paid a $10 entrance fee using prerecorded funds, and were allowed to enter the premises. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Inside Rube's, Harris observed live music being played, female dancers performing partially nude, and one woman dancing on stage fully nude. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) The fully nude dancer offered to give Harris a private dance in the "VIP room" for $20. (Id. ¶ 29.) Using prerecorded bills, Harris paid the disc jockey $10 to enter the "VIP room," where the dancer offered to have sex with Harris for $300. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Later that evening, a second woman offered Harris a private dance for $20. (Id. ¶ 32.) Harris again paid the disc jockey $10 to enter the "VIP room," where the woman offered Harris oral sex for $75. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Harris then telephoned for other police officers to enter Rube's. (Id. ¶ 34.) Haider was arrested for keeping a house of prostitution (id. ¶ 36), and the officers recovered $2100 from Haider's pocket; $36 from a cash box; and cash, including $60 in prerecorded funds, from the disc jockey and the two women who solicited money from Harris in exchange for sex (id. ¶¶ 40-44).

The remaining named defendants played no role in the investigation or subsequent search of Rube's. While driving home on the evening of June 9, 2004, Mayor Kellogg noticed police activity at Rube's, so he stopped by the scene. (Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 50.) Kellogg arrived at Rube's after the investigation began and after Haider had been arrested. (Id. ¶ 51.) Kellogg had no role in the investigation at Rube's nor did he search Haider or the premises. (Id. ¶ 52.) Muhammad, a Deputy Marshall at the time of the raid, did not participate in the raid because he was out of town on June 9, 2004. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 53.) Myers was a clerk with the City of Harvey Police Department and performed only clerical tasks related to Haider's arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 48.) Lewis was employed by the City of Harvey as the Assistant to the Mayor and had no role in activities undertaken by the City of Harvey Police Department. (Id. ¶ 8.)

As for the defendants' role in processing Rube's liquor license, defendants admit that Mayor Kellogg was the Liquor Commissioner for the City of Harvey. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 64.) To obtain a City of Harvey liquor license, however, an applicant was required to submit an application to the Department of Planning and Development, pay all applicable fees, and pass a building inspection. (Id. ¶ 71.) LaTonya Rufus, the Director of Planning and Development for the City of Harvey, oversaw the City's business and liquor license approval process and explained that she would submit an application to Kellogg for approval only after the applicant submitted the requisite documents, paid all fees, and passed a building inspection. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 71.) Rube's liquor license expired on April 30, 2004. (Id. ¶ 66.) As of December 8, 2004, Haider had not completed the application process because his building was not in compliance with the City of Harvey Building Code, and so Haider's application for renewal of Rube's license could not be considered for approval. (Id. ¶ 69.) Although Lewis held the position of Assistant to the Mayor, Lewis did not assist Kellogg in his capacity as Liquor Commissioner. (Id. ¶ 65.)

B. The Procedural History

Two years (less one day) after the police activity at Rube's, Haider filed this lawsuit against Mayor Kellogg, Muhammad, Myers, Lewis, Harris, and Other Unknown Marshals. Haider filed a "Corrected Second Amended Complaint" approximately three months later, naming the above defendants and adding defendants not at issue here. In his Corrected Second Amended Complaint, Haider alleged four federal claims: (1) on June 9, 2004, defendants, acting at Kellogg's direction, unlawfully entered Rube's, conducted a search of the premises that was not supported by probable cause, and illegally seized Haider's personal property (Count I); (2) Kellogg, acting in concert with Lewis, unlawfully refused to renew Haider's liquor license (Count II); (3) defendants used excessive force against Haider when they "beat [him] about the body" following his arrest (Count III); and (4) defendants conspired to conduct a "Sham Raid" on Haider's business "for the purpose of looting the bar to steal [Haider's] personal properties and money" and to "interfere with [Haider's] right to free enterprise" (Count IV). Haider also alleged three state-law claims. On December 20, 2006, the court dismissed defendant Harris from the lawsuit for insufficient service of process. The court also dismissed the newly-added defendants as well as Haider's state law claims. (Dec. 20, 2006 Minute Order.) Now, the remaining defendants-Kellogg, Muhammad, Myers, and Lewis-request summary judgment in their favor on Haider's remaining claims.

Analysis

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Keri v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 627-28 (7th Cir. 2006). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot rest on its pleadings but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual evidence, that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324; Keri, 458 F.3d at 628. Conclusory allegations, "if not supported by the record, will not preclude summary judgment." Keri, 458 F.3d at 628 (citing Haywood v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1997)).

To assist the court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Local Rule 56.1 of the Northern District of Illinois imposes certain requirements on the parties. First, the moving party must file "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." L.R. 56.1(a)(3). In return, the opposing party must file "a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). If the opposing party wants the court to consider facts in addition to those presented by the moving party, the opposing party must file "a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C). It is within the district court's discretion to require strict compliance with Rule 56.1. FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases). In this case, Haider contested many of the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.