The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Robert W. Gettleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In these related cases, plaintiff John W. Costello, Litigation Trustee of the Comdisco Litigation Trust, has sued defendants seeking to enforce defaulted promissory notes. The court has already issued a number of opinions in these cases, including denying a motion to dismiss by all defendants based on lack of standing. Costello v. Haller, 05 C 726 (N.D. Ill. September 23, 2005) ("Costello I"). After all attacks on the pleadings were resolved, all defendants answered the complaint raising a number of affirmative defenses and filed a two count counterclaim. The court then granted in part and denied in part plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim and to strike the affirmative defenses, and granted plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' jury demand. Costello v. Haller, 05 C 726 (N.D. Ill. September 19, 2006) ("Costello II"). Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment against defendants Duncan and Paul on the complaint and counterclaim. Those defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that the notes were unenforceable because they were part of an illegal program. On December 21, 2007, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. Costello v. Haller, 2007 WL 4591381 (N.D. Ill. 2007) ("Costello III").
The parties then attempted to work out a procedure by which the remaining cases would either: 1) be settled; or 2) defendants would agree to judgment against them based on the Duncan and Paul ruling, and proceed to an immediate appeal; or 3) would proceed on new motions for summary judgment. When those efforts proved futile, plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the remaining 25 cases. Defendants then hired new attorneys who sought leave to amend their fifth affirmative defense to argue that the Comdisco Shared Investment Plan ("SIP") violated § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and SEC Rule 10b-5, and their sixth affirmative defense to argue that those violations constitute a breach of contract which excuses defendants' nonperformance. Rather than oppose that motion, plaintiff simply supplemented his motion for summary judgment to address those issues. The matter is now fully briefed*fn1 and, for the reasons discussed below, the court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.*fn2
Defendants are all former employees of Comdisco Inc. In early 1998 Comdisco sponsored and implemented the SIP for certain senior management level employees. The SIP gave participating employees the opportunity to invest in the company by purchasing stock ("SIP shares") with personal loans guaranteed by Comdisco. One hundred percent of the purchase price of the stock was financed by loans from lender banks ("lenders" or "banks") represented by First National Bank of Chicago (now Bank One) as their agent. Comdisco received the loan proceeds directly from the lenders and held the SIP shares. The guarantee was documented in a Facility and Guaranty Agreement ("Facility Agreement") between Comdisco and the lenders. The SIP notes had a fixed maturity and, at maturity, a final balloon payment of principal and interest was due.
The details of the SIP and the circumstances surrounding its presentation to potential participants has been described in detail in the court's previous opinions and will not be repeated here. For purposes of the instant motion it is sufficient to note that each participant received a binder fully explaining those details. As stated in those materials, the SIP shares were subject to a variety of restrictions on resale. Although neither the Facility Agreement nor the SIP notes contained any restrictions on the stock, they both reference the SIP shares as "restricted stock." It is uncontested that the SIP materials fully disclosed and explained to potential participants all such restrictions. In particular, each participant, including each defendant in the instant cases, was told that: (1) Comdisco retained the right of first refusal on the sale of the purchased shares; (2) if the shares were sold within three years of the purchase date, Comdisco was entitled to 50% of any gain from the sale of the stock; (3) if the participant voluntarily left Comdisco within three years of the purchase date (other than for death, disability or change in control of the company), Comdisco was entitled to 50% of any gain from the sale of the stock at any time in the future; (4) Comdisco's compensation committee had the right to impose restrictions on the timing, amount and form of the sale of the SIP shares with respect to any participant if it determined that the restrictions were in the best interest of Comdisco; (5) the shares could not be pledged as security for any other loan; and (6) the proceeds from any sale of the stock had to be applied first to the principal, interest and early payment fees outstanding on the loan.
Each of the defendants participated in the SIP, purchasing varying numbers of shares at the then market rate of $34.50 per share. Within six months of implementation of the SIP program, Comdisco's stock split, giving defendants double the number of shares they originally purchased. Just after the second anniversary of the SIP, Comdisco's stock was trading at $53 per share (more than three times the purchase price). A number of participants elected to sell their SIP shares at that time, generating proceeds sufficient to retire their notes and return a profit, even after the 50% share of the gain to Comdisco required the restriction on sale prior to the third year anniversary.
In July 2001, however, Comdisco filed for bankruptcy protection, an event of default under the SIP notes causing Bank One to accelerate the full amounts due under those notes. Comdisco Holding Company, as successor to Comdisco, ultimately settled is guarantee obligation to the lenders for $126 million. As part of that settlement, the lenders assigned all rights associated with the SIP notes against the borrower to the Comdisco Litigation Trustee (plaintiff). In Costello I the court held that plaintiff was the holder of the defendants' notes with all rights of enforcement.
Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment arguing that, as in Costello III, the undisputed facts demonstrate his right to enforce and collect the notes. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
As in Costello III, there is no dispute as to the facts supporting plaintiff's claim against the remaining defendants. Defendants admit: they executed their respective SIP notes; they directed that the proceeds of the loans be paid directly to Comdisco; Comdisco received those proceeds; the shares were issued to defendants but held by Comdisco's transfer agent on defendants' behalf; and the notes have not been paid. Therefore, all elements of plaintiff's claim have been undeniably established and, absent a viable affirmative defense or counterclaim, plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
In Costello III the court rejected defendants Duncan and Paul's counterclaim and all of their affirmative defenses. The instant defendants raise the same counterclaims and defenses and the court's ruling in Costello III will not be revisited. As noted, however, the instant defendants were granted leave to amend two affirmative defenses to try to plead around the court's conclusion in Costello III that defendants did not have standing to raise a violation of Federal Reserve Board Regulations G or U as a defense. To avoid this conclusion, defendants have amended their fifth affirmative defense to now allege that Comdisco committed securities fraud by telling the SIP participants that the SIP program would not violate Regulations G or U. Defendants have also added an affirmative defense alleging a breach of contract by Comdisco based on the alleged violations of the Regulations that would excuse the defendants' nonperformance. Although defendants have put a creative new gloss on their original argument, the result is the same. To use a currently popular phrase "you can put lipstick on a pig, but it is still a pig."
Both of defendants' new affirmative defenses rely entirely on their argument that the SIP program violated Federal Reserve Board Regulations G (12 C.F.R. §207) and U (12 C.F.R. § 221). These regulations were promulgated pursuant to § 7 of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78(g)(a)), which provides:
For the purpose of preventing excessive use of credit for the purchaser carrying of securities, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall . . . prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may be initially extended and ...