The opinion of the court was delivered by: Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant City of Chicago's Motion to Dismiss in Part Plaintiff's Complaint and Stay Answer. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2008, Plaintiff Linda Brumfield (hereinafter, "Plaintiff") filed a five-count Complaint against the City of Chicago (hereinafter, the "City"). The Plaintiff is a female homosexual African-American police officer and employee of the City. Count I alleges that the City discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Count II alleges that the City made intentionally adverse employment decisions against her based on her race, gender, and sexual preference in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count III alleges that the City deprived her of the security of her employment because of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Count IV alleges violations of the Illinois Human Rights Act (the "IHRA"). Count V alleges a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").
On November 27, 2006, Plaintiff cross-filed charges of employment discrimination against the City with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (the "IDHR") and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). In this charge, she alleged that discrimination took place from October 1, 2003 to November 27, 2006 based on her race and sex. Specifically, she alleged that since October 2003, she had been subjected to harassment in the form of excessive discipline and derogatory remarks; in June 2006, she was subjected to unnecessary medical and psychological exams; and in August, October, and November 2006, she was disciplined.
On May 17, 2007, Plaintiff cross-filed another charge based on retaliation from January 16, 2007 to May 10, 2007. She alleged that she did not receive a transfer that she requested until she bid for it, the Police Department filed unwarranted complaint registers against her, she was forced to submit to unnecessary psychological and medical exams, and she was forced to drive an unsafe vehicle and injured on the job as a result.
On December 11, 2007, Plaintiff cross-filed a third charge based on retaliation from January 1, 2007 to November 5, 2007. She alleged that she was subjected to unwarranted disciplinary actions, placed on mandatory medical stationary status, subjected to psychological exams, and stripped of police powers and removed from the department bidding process. Ex. A to Def.'s Mem.
On January 10, 2008, the EEOC issued Plaintiff right-to-sue letters for each of her three EEOC charges. See Ex. C to Def.'s Mem.
The City moves to dismiss a portion of Count I and all of Counts II, III, IV, and V.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). "A complaint must always, . . . allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'" Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 ...