The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Dominick Giampaolo's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Giampaolo's habeas petition.
Giampaolo was arrested and charged with the criminal sexual assault of his 17-year-old stepdaughter in McHenry County, Illinois. While released on bond, Giampaolo solicited a person in Kane County, Illinois, to kidnap his stepdaughter and deliver her to a hotel in an attempt to convince her to recant her testimony concerning the criminal sexual assault. (R. 17-1, Rule 5 Exs., Ex. A.) The present habeas petition concerns Giampaolo's Kane County conviction for the solicitation to commit aggravated kidnaping.
II. Procedural Background
After pleading guilty to one count of solicitation to commit aggravated kidnaping on June 4, 2001, the Circuit Court of Kane County sentenced Giampaolo to eight years imprisonment to be served consecutively with his sentence related to the McHenry County criminal sexual assault conviction. (Id.; R. 3-1, Pet. Mem., at 2.) On November 14, 2001, Giampaolo filed a document labeled "Notice of Intent to Appeal," but he did not pursue a direct appeal to vacate his guilty plea. (Ex. A.)
B. Petitions for Post-Judgment Relief
Thereafter, Giampaolo filed two petitions for relief from judgment pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/2-1401, in the Circuit Court of Kane County. Under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2-1401, litigants, including criminal defendants, can challenge the facts underlying a final judgment. See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill.2d 555, 562, 280 Ill.Dec. 311, 802 N.E.2d 236 (2003); People v. Haynes, 192 Ill.2d 437, 460-61, 249 Ill.Dec. 779, 737 N.E.2d 169 (2000). Specifically "[a] section 2-1401 petition for relief from a final judgment is the forum in a criminal case in which to correct all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered, which, if then known, would have prevented its rendition." Haynes, 192 Ill.2d at 461. In short, Section 2-1401 only addresses factual issues -- not legal or constitutional issues -- and thus serves a different purpose than the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq. See People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 472, 282 Ill.Dec. 663, 806 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill.App.Ct. 2004); see also People v. Welch, 376 Ill.App.3d 705, 711, 315 Ill.Dec. 647, 877 N.E.2d 134 (Ill.App.Ct. 2007) (purpose of post-conviction act "is to resolve allegations that constitutional violations occurred at trial, when those allegations have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously."). As the Supreme Court of Illinois recently articulated, the post-conviction hearing act "provides a different form of statutory relief than does section 2-1401, notwithstanding that it, like section 2-1401, allows for collateral relief from judgments, albeit only collateral relief in criminal cases for constitutional violations." People v. Vincent, 226 Ill.2d 1, 11, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. 2007).
C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Meanwhile, on June 2, 2004, Giampaolo filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Kane County pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (Ex. N.) In his post-conviction petition, Giampaolo argued that: (1) the Supremacy Clause precluded his conviction; (2) the State did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the State violated his constitutional right to equal protection because it prosecuted similarly situated persons with less severe offenses; (4) the Illinois kidnaping statute did not give fair warning of the conduct it prohibited; (5) the Circuit Court failed to apply the rule of lenity in interpreting the statute; and (6) trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.)
On November 7, 2006, Giampaolo filed an amended post-conviction petition. (Ex. O.) In his amended petition, Giampaolo asserted the following claims: (1) he was entitled to modification of his sentence because he was not admonished that three years of mandatory supervised release ("MSR") would attach to his plea-bargained sentence; (2) he was erroneously denied good-time credits; (3) he was improperly sentenced as a Class 1 offender; (4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of kidnaping because he was the parent of the victim; and (5) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) On November 8, 2006, the trial court summarily dismissed Giampaolo's amended post-conviction petition. (Ex. P.) Giampaolo then filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied on December 19, 2006. (Ex. Q.) Thereafter, Giampaolo appealed the denial of his post-conviction petition to the Illinois Appellate Court raising two claims: (1) the trial court erred in failing to ...