The opinion of the court was delivered by: Matthew F. Kennelly United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge
After a bench trial held in October 2001, this Court convicted Michael Fadeyi on charges of conspiracy to possess heroin with the intent to distribute, attempting to possess heroin with the intent to distribute, and distribution of heroin. United States v. Fadeyi, No. 00 CR 153. The Court sentenced Fadeyi to a term of 151 months of imprisonment and also entered an order of forfeiture in the amount of $780,000. Fadeyi then appealed his conviction and sentence. In March 2004, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction, vacated the forfeiture order, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the issue of forfeiture. United States v. Fadeyi, No. 02-2596 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2004).
After the remand, Fadeyi filed a motion in this Court seeking a full re-sentencing to correct what he argued was an illegal sentence. Fadeyi based this motion on the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), both of which were issued following the remand. On October 12, 2004, this Court denied Fadeyi's motion for a full re-sentencing on the ground that the Seventh Circuit's remand was limited to the forfeiture issue. The Court reduced the amount of the forfeiture to $121,000.
Fadeyi again appealed. The Seventh Circuit ordered a limited remand to determine whether this Court would have imposed the same sentence had it understood the Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory rather than mandatory. This Court entered an order stating that it would not have imposed the same sentence had the Guidelines not been mandatory at the time of Fadeyi's sentencing. As a result, the Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a full resentencing.
In December 2005, the Court resentenced Fadeyi to a term of 132 months of imprisonment, nineteen months below the original sentence. Fadeyi again appealed, and this time the Seventh Circuit affirmed. United States v. Fadeyi, 196 Fed. Appx. 429, 430 (7th Cir. 2006).
Fadeyi has now filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which he asks the Court to vacate the judgment against him. Fadeyi contends that his attorneys at the trial and appellate levels provided ineffective assistance. He also claims the Court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at resentencing by using the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine the quantity of drugs for which Fadeyi was accountable. For the following reasons, the Court denies Fadeyi's motion.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Fadeyi claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorney failed to inform him of the consequences of waiving his right to a jury trial. Fadeyi contends that the Court never obtained a written waiver of his right to a jury and also contends that his attorney failed to ensure that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury.
Contrary to Fadeyi's contention, he did in fact sign a written waiver of his right to a jury trial on October 9, 2001 before the trial began. In open court and on the record, the Court asked Fadeyi to confirm that his signature appeared on the waiver form and also asked him if he had read the document before signing it. Fadeyi answered both questions in the affirmative. Tr. Oct. 9, 2001 at 20-21. The Court had earlier questioned Fadeyi in detail to ensure that he understood his right to a jury trial and the consequences of waiving that right, and that he was waiving a jury knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 14-16.
When a defendant challenges the validity of his waiver of a jury in a collateral attack like the one Fadeyi has filed, the defendant bears the burden of showing that his waiver was prima facie invalid. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1983). Before accepting a jury trial waiver, a court must discuss with the defendant 1) the composition of a jury, 2) the requirement of jury unanimity, 3) the defendant's right to participate in jury selection, and 4) the fact that the court alone will decide the issue of guilt if the defendant waives a jury. United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1983). The record reflects that the Court thoroughly questioned Fadeyi before it accepted his jury waiver. The Court specifically informed Fadeyi of each of the factors listed above and determined that he understood each of them. Tr. Oct. 9, 2001 at 14-16. Fadeyi has offered nothing, and nothing appears in the record, to suggest that his waiver was anything but ...