Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 07 C 387-John C. Shabaz, Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Tinder, Circuit Judge
Before FLAUM, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
This is a case about ERISA preemption. The plaintiff-appellant, Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. ("Franciscan Skemp"), is a healthcare provider in La Crosse, Wisconsin. The defendant-appellee, Central States Joint Board Health and Welfare Trust Fund ("Central States"), is an employee benefit plan. Sherry Romine, through her employment, was a Central States plan participant. She came to Franciscan Skemp in October 2003 seeking medical treatment. Before providing services, Franciscan Skemp called Central States to verify Central States's coverage of Romine and the relevant services. A Central States representative made oral representations that they were covered. Franciscan Skemp treated Romine. Following unsuccessful efforts to receive payment from Central States, after submitting a claim for benefits, Franciscan Skemp learned that Central States would not pay-it turns out that Romine lost her benefits, effective September 30, 2003, for failing to pay COBRA premiums. When Franciscan Skemp called in October to verify coverage, the Central States representative failed to disclose that Romine's coverage was subject to COBRA and that the coverage could be retroactively canceled.
Franciscan Skemp brought suit against Central States in Wisconsin state court in May 2007, alleging claims of negligent misrepresentation and estoppel under the laws of that state. Central States filed a notice purporting to remove the case to federal court on the grounds that the claims were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction, and then moved to dismiss in district court for failure to state a claim under ERISA. Franciscan Skemp opposed the motion to dismiss and brought its own motion to remand to state court. The district court concluded that the state-law claims were completely preempted by ERISA, thus establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction. After recharacterizing the claims as ones arising under ERISA, the district court also dismissed them for failure to state a claim. We are now presented with Franciscan Skemp's appeal. We review the legal question of whether there was federal jurisdiction, and proper removal, de novo. Alexander v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 484 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 2007).
Complete preemption, really a jurisdictional rather than a preemption doctrine, confers exclusive federal jurisdiction in certain instances where Congress intended the scope of a federal law to be so broad as to entirely replace any state-law claim. ERISA is such an area: "[T]he ERISA civil enforcement mechanism is one of those provisions with such 'extraordinary pre-emptive power' that it 'converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.' "Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987)). Complete preemption, therefore, creates an exception to the ordinary application of the well-pleaded-complaint rule-that a court only looks to the complaint to determine whether there is federal-question jurisdiction. Artful pleading on the part of a plaintiff to disguise federal claims by cleverly dressing them in the clothing of state-law theories will not succeed in keeping the case in state court. In these instances, the federal law has effectively displaced any potential state-law claims. " 'When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.' " Davila, 542 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). Accordingly, such claims are removable.
Of course the difficulty arises in drawing the line between what is completely preempted and what escapes the cast of the federal net. The Supreme Court in Davila used a two-part analysis for determining when a claim has been completely preempted by ERISA:
[I]f an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of coverage for medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan, and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls "within the scope of" ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) . . . . In other words, if an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant's actions, then the individual's cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
Davila, 542 U.S. at 210.*fn1
Under the district court's and Central States's reasoning, Franciscan Skemp could have brought its state-law claims of negligent misrepresentation and estoppel under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).*fn2 Franciscan Skemp took an assignment of benefits from Romine and filed a claim form with Central States. The filing of the form and the language on the form demonstrate an assignment of benefits. Once Romine's assignee, Franciscan Skemp stands in her shoes and is an ERISA beneficiary. As a beneficiary, Franciscan Skemp was entitled to bring a claim under ERISA. Franciscan Skemp requested that Central States be "estopped from denying coverage benefits for the Romine medical services" and that a "judgment [be entered] against defendant for the services provided by Franciscan Skemp as would otherwise be covered by defendant's plan." The district court found that "[t]hese requests establish that the gravamen of plaintiff's cause of action is a desire to recover benefits it believes are due to it under the terms of the Plan." Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA provides that a beneficiary can bring an action to "recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." Therefore, the argument goes, Franciscan Skemp's claims are within ERISA § 502's scope.
What the district court and Central States too easily overlook, however, is that Franciscan Skemp is not bringing these claims as Romine's assignee. Admittedly at first glance it looks like a claim that would arise under ERISA-a beneficiary's assignee bringing an action to recover plan benefits. But upon closer examination, that is not at all what is happening here.
Franciscan Skemp is bringing these claims of negligent misrepresentation and estoppel, not as Romine's assignee, but entirely in its own right. These claims arise not from the plan or its terms, but from the alleged oral representations made by Central States to Franciscan Skemp. Franciscan Skemp could bring ERISA claims in Romine's shoes as a beneficiary for the denial of benefits under the plan; but it has not. In fact, Franciscan Skemp does not at all dispute Central States's decision to deny Romine coverage. Franciscan Skemp acknowledges that Romine is not entitled to benefits, because she failed to make her COBRA premium payments. It would be odd indeed, then, to conclude that Franciscan Skemp is standing in Romine's shoes as a beneficiary seeking benefits when Franciscan Skemp acknowledges that Romine is not actually entitled to any benefits. Franciscan Skemp is basing its claims on a conversation to which Romine was not even a party. Thus Franciscan Skemp is not and could not be "standing in her shoes" or asserting her rights. Franciscan Skemp is bringing its own independent claims, and these claims are simply not claims to "enforce the rights under the terms of the plan." ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
What of the claim form then? We do not quarrel with the determination below that the claim form evidences an assignment of benefits; we just disagree with the import of that determination. The claim form was filed before Franciscan Skemp was aware that Romine hadn't made her payments and that Central States would deny coverage. At that point in time, it was perfectly logical for Franciscan Skemp to file the form as Romine's assignee. Upon learning that Central States would not pay due to Romine's failure to pay COBRA premiums, Franciscan Skemp then asserted its own rights by bringing this lawsuit. Simply because at one point in time Franciscan Skemp acknowledged an assignment from Romine does not mean that it simultaneously and implicitly gave up any claim(s) it had against Central States apart from that assignment.
Central States also makes much of the references in the complaint to the plan and the request that Central States pay "to the extent said services would otherwise have been covered." These references, however, are solely for the purpose of identifying a damages amount; they do not convert the claims into ones ...