The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Cleve Cotton, III and Darryl T. Scott bring the present one-count First Amended Complaint against Defendant Asset Acceptance, LLC ("Asset Acceptance"), alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. For the following reasons, the Court, in its discretion, grants Plaintiffs' Rule 23 motion.
In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Asset Acceptance is engaged in the business of purchasing charged-off consumer debts, including telecommunications debts, and enforcing the debts against consumers. (R. 8-1, First Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) On February 26, 2007, Asset Acceptance filed a lawsuit against Cotton in the Circuit Court of Cook County to collect a debt for personal telecommunications services. (Id. ¶ 14.) The state court entered a default judgment of $2,373.00 against Cotton in June 2007. (Id.) On or about June 18, 2007, Asset Acceptance filed a lawsuit against Scott in the Circuit Court of Cook County to collect a debt for personal telecommunications services. (Id. ¶ 15.) Asset Acceptance filed these state court lawsuits as an assignee of AT&T, a telecommunications company regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Plaintiffs further allege that the charges for which recovery was sought in their state court lawsuits were more than two years old and that the applicable statute of limitations to an action for the recovery of charges by a telecommunications carrier regulated by the Federal Communications Commission is two years pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 415. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18.) Plaintiffs also allege that Asset Acceptance regularly files and threatens to file lawsuits on federally-regulated telecommunications debts that are more than two years old at the time of the filing. (Id. ¶ 22.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that Asset Acceptance engages in a pattern and practice of filing lawsuits on time-barred debts of modest amounts knowing that the persons sued could not retain counsel to defend such suits except by paying an amount comparable to that sought in the lawsuits. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs thus maintain that Asset Acceptance's conduct constitutes both a deceptive and unfair collection practice in violation of the FDCPA. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states that "[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006).
Failure to meet any of these Rule 23(a) requirements precludes class certification. Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1993).
In addition to satisfying the requirements under Rule 23(a), a party seeking class certification must also establish that the proposed class satisfies one of the requirements set forth in Rule 23(b). Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997); Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513. Here, Plaintiffs request certification of the proposed class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which applies when "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3); see also Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615. Under Rule 23(b)(3), members of a certified class may opt out and pursue their claims individually. See In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 2005).
The party seeking class certification has the burden of establishing that certification is proper. See Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513; Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1993). In determining whether a party has carried that burden, a court need not accept all of the complaint's allegations as true. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Mach., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, in deciding whether to certify a class, the court "should make whatever factual and legal inquiries [that] are necessary under Rule 23." Id. at 676. Finally, district courts have broad discretion in determining motions for class certification. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979); Payton v. County of Carroll, 473 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiffs define the class they seek to certify as follows:
The class consists of (a) all individuals (b) against whom defendant Asset Acceptance, LLC filed a lawsuit in Illinois, Wisconsin or Indiana (c) to collect a debt for cellular or other federally regulated telecommunications services (d) where any of the telecommunications charges antedated the filing of the lawsuit by two years, (e) which lawsuit was pending at any time during a period beginning one year ...