The opinion of the court was delivered by: Murphy, District Judge
This is "a nightmare of a class action." Smith v. Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 387 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2004).
Ninety-seven plaintiffs seek recovery from ten defendants engaged in the manufacture and distribution of lawnmowers. They claim defendants misrepresented the horsepower produced by the lawnmowers and conspired with each other to deceive consumers. The third amended class action complaint (see Doc. 10, Exhibits 2-9) asserts federal claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, together with statutory and common-law claims under the laws of forty-four states. Plaintiffs also seek certification of the RICO claims on behalf of a nationwide class of purchasers who, from January 1, 1994, to the present, purchased lawnmowers manufactured or distributed by defendants containing gas combustible engines having up to 30 horsepower, as well as certification of "subclasses" of such purchasers under the state laws of forty-four states.
Jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For the following reasons, the RICO claims asserted in the third amended complaint are dismissed, as well as all state-law claims, other than those arising under Illinois law. The motion to approve a class wide settlement between plaintiffs and defendant MTD Products, Inc. ("MTD") is also denied.
In evaluating dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in a plaintiff's complaint as true. See Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 2002). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint, not to determine the merits of a case. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Turning first to the matter of the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' RICO claims, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides, in pertinent part, "It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). "To state a claim under § 1962(c), a RICO plaintiff must show the '(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.'" Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). See also LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 393 (7th Cir. 1995); McDonald v. Schencker, 18 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1994). An "enterprise" for RICO purposes means "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). A "pattern of racketeering activity" means "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). "Racketeering activity" means certain acts that are chargeable and punishable as felonies under state law or that are indictable under specific federal criminal statutes, as set out in an exclusive list in RICO's definitions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
In general, "allegations of fraud in a civil RICO complaint are subject to the heightened pleading standard of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to plead all averments of fraud with particularity." Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Found., 244 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir. 2001). "Accordingly, a RICO plaintiff must, at a minimum, describe the two predicate acts of fraud with some specificity and state the time, place, and content of the alleged false representations, the method by which the misrepresentations were communicated, and the identities of the parties to those misrepresentations." Id. "Moreover, in a multiple defendant case, Rule 9(b) requires a RICO plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to notify each defendant of his alleged participation in the scheme." Goren v. New Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (dismissing RICO claim for "lump[ing] all the defendants together" and failing to specify "who was involved in what activity").
The Seventh Circuit holds that "[a] RICO complaint must identify the enterprise." Richmond, 52 F.3d at 645. "While a RICO enterprise can be formal or informal, some type of organizational structure is required." Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Richmond, 52 F.3d at 645 ("The hallmark of an enterprise is a structure."). More specifically, a RICO enterprise must have "an ongoing 'structure' of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual decision making," with "goals separate from the predicate acts themselves." Stachon, 229 F.3d at 675 (internal citations omitted). Although an enterprise can be an informal association-in-fact, "[t]he hallmark of an enterprise is structure," and the goals of the enterprise must be separate from the predicate acts themselves. Richmond, 52 F.3d at 645 (quotation omitted). See also Stachon, 229 F.3d at 676 (noting that plaintiffs cannot establish structure by explaining what an enterprise supposedly does). An association-in-fact enterprise requires continuity and the differentiation of roles, as well as a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. See Richmond, 52 F.3d at 645. See also Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that a common purpose is an "essential ingredient" of any association-in-fact enterprise).
A RICO enterprise must consist of more than a group of people who get together to commit a pattern of racketeering activity. See Richmond, 52 F.3d at 644. The enterprise must be "distinct, separate, and apart from a pattern of racketeering activity: although a pattern of racketeering activity may be the means through which the enterprise interacts with society, it is not itself the enterprise, for an enterprise is defined by what it is, not what it does." Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1440 (7th Cir. 1990). Also, in this Circuit, to establish statutory distinctness, plaintiffs must establish that each RICO person actively participated or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged scheme, or unwittingly permitted legitimate business operations to become a conduit of criminal activity. Bare legal and factual distinctness is insufficient. A plaintiff must prove the role played by the legally distinct person was non-incidental to bringing about (or concealing) a pattern of racketeering activity.
"The prototypical RICO case is one in which a person bent on criminal activity seizes control of a previously legitimate firm and uses the firm's resources, contacts, facilities, and appearance of legitimacy to perpetrate more, and less easily discovered, criminal acts than he could do in his own person, that is, without channeling his criminal activities through the enterprise that he has taken over." Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). "The [RICO person] must be shown to use its agents or affiliates in a way that bears at least a family resemblance to the paradigmatic RICO case in which a criminal obtains control of a legitimate (or legitimate-appearing) firm and uses the firm as the instrument of his criminality." Emery v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1324 (7th Cir. 1998).
Here, the plaintiffs have alleged enough to conclusively take their case outside of the paradigm. It is impossible to imagine that the enterprises as alleged wrested control of the long established legitimate businesses for the purpose alleged. The businesses could easily have accomplished what is alleged absent the associations-in-fact, and the latter by no means controlled the former. So what ...